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A CENTURY OF TORT LAW IN CANADA
WHITHER UNUSUAL DANGERS, PRODUCTS





A century ago, in the twenty-first year of the reign of Her Majesty
Queen Victoria, the Upper Canada Court of Queen's Bench, in
the Michaelmas term, decided the case of Plant v. The Grand
Trunk Railway Company.' William plant, an employee of the de-
fendant, was helping to clear away the snow on a railway track
near Georgetown, Ontario, when a freight train approached . The
foreman instructed the workmen "to clear", but William plant,
taken by surprise, "lost his presence of mind" and ran along the
track in front of the train instead. Because of the negligence of
the train's crew in tending the brakes, the train was unable to
stop promptly, overtook William plant and killed him. His widow
sued and won a jury verdict at trial, but, on appeal, the action
was dismissed. Chief Justice Draper declared that : "Servants
must be supposed to have the risk of the service in their con-
templation when they voluntarily undertake it and agree to accept
the stipulated remuneration . If therefore one of them suffers from
the wrongful act or carelessness of another the master will not be
responsible"! Since the poor brakes were due to the "negligence,
not of the defendants, . . . but of the persons employed by the
defendants in the conduct and management of the train . . ." 3 the
the doctrine of common employment applied to preclude recovery .
Alternatively, Chief Justice Draper continued, "we can scarcely
imagine a clearer case of contributory negligence".' His Lordship
concluded: "The loss and misfortune to the plaintiff and her
children is doubtless very serious and sad, but we must not be
*Allen M. Linden, of Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto.
'(1867), 27 U.C.Q.B . 78 .
	
3 Ibid., at p. 84 .
2 Ibid ., at pp. 82-83 . 4 Ibid., at p. 86 .
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drawn out of our path of duty, even by our feelings for the widow
and orphans"."
Plant v . Grand Trunk Railway is not a leading case at all ; it
was selected because it depicts the cruelty of the Canadian law of
torts and the prevailing attitude of the Canadian judiciary toward
their "path of duty" in 1867. There existed, of course, other similar
horrors, in addition to contributory negligence and the doctrine
of common employment, that reflected the rugged individualism
and laissez faire philosophy of the power elite of the time .' In the
last hundred years, as our infant industries matured and as our
social consciousness awakened, some of the most iniquitous of
these rules have been buried. It is now virtually impossible for a
workman's widow such as Mrs. Plant to go uncompensated, be-
cause legislation assures reparation in such cases, regardless of the
defences of common employment, contributory negligence and
voluntary assumption of risk, the third of the "unholy trinity" of
defences . Moreover, the early harshness of contributory negligence
theory has been mollified, first by the judicially created doctrine of
"last clear chance",' and, subsequently also, by the passage of the
comparative negligence Acts.' Numerous other reforms have been
effectuated which have gone a long way toward humanizing the
law of torts . More importantly, a more consistent approach to tort
problems is evolving as the courts are slowly becoming aware of
the abolition of the forms of action.'
But many of the relics of pre-confederation Canada still
flourish, despite a vastly changed world and despite the widening
gap between the law of torts and the expectations of the Canadian
people . The courts still insist upon placing everyone who enters
another's premises into one of three immutable categories." They
have not yet brought the law of products liability into harmony
with the development in modern merchandizing ." In utilizing penal
legislation in tort suits, Canadian courts cling to the myth of
legislative intention when numerous judges and authors have
3 Mid.
'See Fleming, The Law of Torts (3rd . ed. . 1965), pp. 224-225 and p.
465.
' Daries v. Mann (1842), 10 M. & W. J46; MacIntyre, Rationale of Last
Clear Chance (1940) . 18 Can. Bar Rev. 257.
' See S.O ., 1924, c. 32, now The Negligence Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 261 .
'Wright, The Law of Torts: 1923-1947 (1948), 26 Can. Bar Rev. 46 .
'° White v. Imperial Optical Co . (1957), 7 D.L.R. (2d) 471 (Ont. C.A .)
rev'ing (1957), 6 D.L.R . (2d) 496.
11 See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel: (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer) (1966), 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 .
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demonstrated the hypocrisy of this quest." The concept of no
liability without fault remains the shibboleth in Canadian decisions
although elsewhere doubt is being cast upon its effectiveness and
validity as a loss-distribution technique in the modern world."
There are on display in the Canadian reports such museum pieces
as the doctrine of "last clear chance", the marital immunity, in-
sanity and infancy immunities, the Good Samaritan rule and a
host of others."
To explain why Canadian tort law has developed so sluggishly
is by no means easy. One reason is that our courts, rather than
choosing the best solution boldly and openly from among the alter
natives presented, have instead abdicated their responsibilities to
the English courts. While this was understandable when the Privy
Council was the final arbiter of Canadian disputes, it no longer
is now that we have been freed from their supervisory powers."
For some strange reason, the Supreme Court of Canada has not
fully recognized the extent of its power to forge a Canadian law
of torts . Indeed, as we enter our second century of nationhood,
some tort teachers in this land doubt whether there exists such a
thing as "Canadian" tort law . The underdeveloped character of
Canadian tort law was illustrated by Dean Wright's response to a
criticism that his casebook contained insuAicient Canadian de-
cisions :" "Unfortunately, there are few Canadian cases representing
possibilities that are not better explored and better understood by
the English cases"." There is no reason why this situation must en-
dure . Canadian judges have, on occasion, manifested that they are
capable of original and imaginative work . Justice Roach, for ex-
ample, wrote a magnificent opinion restructuring the obsolete
English law of animals on the highway to correspond with modern
conditions . He declared:"
It is now over 200 years since Thomas Gray wrote his famous lines
descriptive of rural England at eventide, "The lowing herd winds slowly
o'er the lea" . The lea no doubt included such highways as then trav-
1 2 Alexander, Legislation and the Standard of Care in Negligence(1964), 42 Can . Bar Rev . 243 ; Williams, The Effect of Penal Legislationin the Law of Tort (1960), 23 Mod . L. Rev. 233 ; Linden, Tort Liability
for Criminal Nonfeasance (1966), 44 Can . Bar Rev. 25 .
" Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault (1951), reprinted at (1966),54 Cal. L . Rev. 1422 ; Harper and James, The Law of Torts (1956) .i' See generally, Fleming, op. cit., footnote 6 .
"Wright, The English Law of Torts : A Criticism (1955-56), 11 U.T.L .J . 84, at p . 108 .
"Lederman, Book Review (1954), 32 Can. Bar Rev. 1155, at p . 1157 ."Wright, op . cit ., footnote 15, at p . 112.
"Atkinson v . Fleming, [19561 O.R. 801, at p . 822, aff'd Fleming v.Atkinson, [19591 S.C.R . 513, 18 D.L.R. (2d) 81 .
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ersed the landscape . As I read the modern English cases the herd may
still wander along those same highways without the owner being subject
to civil liability for the injuries they may cause. No longer in this Prov-
ince does "the ploughman homeward plod his weary way" . He goes
now in his tractor, oft-times along the highway. The farmer whose
lands adjoin the King's Highway can in this modern era scarcely know
the meaning of "the solemn stillness" of which Gray wrote. No longer
can he be conscious of the beetle wheeling his droning flight. What he
hears, instead, is the whir of motor cars wheeling their way at legalized
speed along the adjoining highway. The common law of England may
have been adequate in Gray's day. The Courts in England have held
that it is still adequate, but surely it must be apparent that to-day in
this Province it is not.
The Canadian courts have turned their backs on other English
authority as well ; the Supreme Court of Canada has recently de-
clared its independence from London Graving Dock v . Hot-ton,"
British Transport v. Gourley," Jacob v . London County Council,"
the old control test of vicarious liability" and others." In the years
ahead we can expect, hopefully, even more evidence of maturity,
but, all too often, Canadian judges still abide by English precedent
blindly without balancing the conflicting policies in the light of
Canadian conditions." This might be less unacceptable if the Eng-
lish courts were attuned to social developments and willing to
reshape tort law to reflect these changes, but this not the case . In
England, judges regard Parliament as the sole amender of the law
and are reluctant to strike out on new paths themselves . The
various English law reform commissions, have prodded Parliament
to action on occasion," but, when Canadian courts imitate their
English brethren by refusing to exorcise some anomaly or other,
our legislatures do not react . Consequently, Canadian courts may
adhere to lifeless English precedents,` so that we end up as "more
English than the English"!
"Campbell v . Royal Bank of Canada (1963), 46 W.W.R . 79, 43 D.L.R.
(2d) 341, [19641 S.C.R . 85, noted by Harris (1964) . 42 Can. Bar Rev. 607.
s° The Queen v. Jennings & Cronsberr ;v (1966) . 57 D.L.R. (2d) 644
(S.C.C.) noted by Bale, (1966), 44 Can. Bar Rev. 724; See also Bale,
British Transport v . Gourley Reconsidered (1966), 44 Can. Bar Rev. 66 .
~' Hillman v . Machuosh, [19591 S.C.R . 384.zz Co-operators Insurance v. Kearney (1965), 48 D.L.R . (2d) 1, per
Spence J. (S.C.C .) .
"See Alexander, Recent Developments in the Law of Torts (1966),
Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada, p. 1 .
"f As when the "Wagon Mound" was decided, see Gibson, The Wagon
Mound in Canadian Courts (1963), 2 Osgoode Hall, L.J . 416, see also
Smith, Requiem for Polemis (1965), 2 U.B.C .L . Rev. 159.
"See the Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 3r 6 Eliz 2, c. 31 .
:F As with Inderruaur v . Dames (1866), L.R . 1 C.P . 274, aff'd L.R . 2
C.P . 311 (Ex. Ch.) .
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Put the quality of our judiciary can only reflect the calibre of
the legal profession from whom they are drawn. The members
of the negligence bar in Canada have been predominantly prag
matic men, not overly concerned with social needs or philosophical
issues and they have not respected these qualities in other men.
They have not challenged the courts, as have their American
counterparts, with bold, new causes of actions, nor have they
pressed actively for legislative reform, nor have they supported
much research . It must be admitted, however, that the quality of
Canadian lawyers is dependent upon the character of their law
schools. In the field of torts, as in others, we in the law schools
are in no position to cast the first stone. Without doubt, Dean
Wright, ably assisted by such men as Dr . Malcolm MacIntyre,
strove mightily to bring some order into the law of torts, but so
far they have been largely unheeded by our courts and our bar.
Burdened by large teaching loads and administrative duties, the
early Canadian torts men were unable to fashion a Canadian law
of torts by producing sufficient treatises, articles and commentary
as did Professors Bohlen, Seavey, Smith, Prosser, Green, Harper,
James, Morris, Keaton, Malone and Ehrenzweig. In fact there is
still no Canadian textbook on tort law. To-day, however, there
are over two dozen full-time professors teaching torts in Canada .
Banded together in the new torts subsection of the Association of
Canadian Law Teachers, such men as Professors Lang, Gray,
Gibson, Smith, Alexander, Weiler, Dunlop and others are deter-
mined to remake our law of torts. With the help of Professor
Fleming's excellent text book, The Law of Torts, an alert bar
and a sympathetic judiciary, victory may soon be achieved .
Ironically, however, now that tort law is about to be stream-
lined to incorporate some of the new thinking about loss-distribu-
tion and some of the social facts of modern life, we are beset with
doubts about its future . Tort law may soon be rendered super-
fluous by burgeoning social welfare legislation, changing insurance
practices and other institutional alterations . If this is so, our battle
to humanize the law of torts may have been in vain .
This article will attempt to explore in some detail three im-
portant areas of personal injury law in the light of this new chal-
lenge. It will not canvass the many detailed substantive changes
in the Canadian law of torts for this has been done elsewhere."
Nor will it explore the jurisprudential developments of the entire
field, because Dean Wright has already done this in superb
" Alexander, op. cit., footnote 23 .
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fashion ."' First, the concept of "unusual danger", that has sur-
vived in Canada for a century, despite an illegitimate birth, a
propensity for spreading confusion and a complete absence of
merit, will be discussed . Second, the area of products liability,
once transformed and now due to undergo another metamorphosis
will be considered . Third, automobile accident compensation will
be examined, for it is dissatisfaction with the performance of tort
law in resolving these problems that threatens the future existence
of the entire field . Lastly, an attempt will be made to assess
whether, in the light of these developments, the continued existence
of tort law is justified .
I . Unusual Dangers .
It is pretty well agreed the the Canadian law of occupiers' liability
is a mess." Indeed, nowhere else in the law of torts has confusion
been as prevalent and injustice as rampant as it has been in dis-
putes arising out of injuries sustained on the land of another ."' This
is understandable, perhaps, for "the history of this subject is one
of conflict between the general principles of the law of negligence
and the traditional immunity of landowners"." In this clash,
Canadian landowners have emerged victorious . Despite significant
advances by legislation in the United Kingdom," the birthplace of
the notion of special privileges for the landed gentry, and by de-
cisions in the United States," Canadian courts have clung to a
system of rigid rules and formal categories devised in the last
century to protect landowners from unsympathetic juries ." } True,
Canadian judges have noticeably squirmed occasionally, indicating
that they "would prefer to avoid categorization", but, rather than
abandoning the meaningless ritual, they have usually succumbed
for, after all, "the categories are here, and the . , . liability of occu-
_w Wright, op . cit ., footnote 9.
'4 Harris, Some Trends in the Law of Occupiers Liability (1963), 41
Can. Bar Rev. 401 ; McDonald and Leigh, The Law of Occupiers Liability
and the Need for Reform in Canada (1965), 16 U.T,L .J . 55 ; A. L. Mac-
Donald, Invitees (1930), 8 Can. Bar Rev. 344; Friedmann, Liability to
Visitors of Premises (1 1943), 21 Can. Bar Rev. 79 .
"° See generally Fleming, op. cit ., footnote 6, p. 404.
" Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His
Premises of Their Own Right (1920), 69 U. Pa . L. Rev. 142, 237, 340, at
P. 237 .
"s Occupiers' Liability Act, supra, footnote 25 .
"See generally Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (3rd ed ., 1964),
p. 358.
34 Fleming, up . cit ., footnote 6, p. 404; see also Marsh, The History and
Comparative Law of Invitees . Licensees and Trespassers (1953), 69 L.Q .
Rev. 182, 359, at pp . 185-186.
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piers [is] conventionally determined with reference to them"."
Where, in the past, judges have evinced some independence of
thought, they were promptly slapped down by higher courts, who
have steadfastly insisted that there were three immutable categories
of entrants, trespassers, licensees and invitees, to whom three dis-
tinct duties of care were owed." Authors have attacked this rigid
scheme, some urging the creation of additional categories," and
others suggesting a reduction in the number of categories," but
our legislatures and judiciary are still unwilling to take the drastic
steps required to transport this body of law into the twentieth cen-
tury. Despite this reluctance toward change, there have been some
minor improvements, such as the emergence of a new category of
contractual entrant, who pays for the right to enter land, to whom
the courts have applied ordinary negligence principles," so that a
landlord is now under an "obligation to use reasonable care to
keep the premises reasonably safe for his tenant"." Moreover,
invitees, of tenants are now also invitees of landlords," and oc-
cupiers must use reasonable care toward all reasonably fore-
seeable entrants in the conduct of activities on their land.' But
these are only tiny chinks in the armour ; the entire field cries out
for a complete overhaul . In the meantime, however, we must do
what we can to explain it, to prune it where necessary, and to
assist the judiciary in their work of day to day application . One
particular concept that we can focus on is that of "unusual
danger", for, under scrutiny, it does not stand up and should be
laid to rest.
1. The Dubious Origin of The Phrase "Unusual Danger".
One of the most unusual developments in tort law in the last
century has been the evolution of the concept of unusual danger .
All lawyers, text writers and judges agree that, if someone who
enters upon land is classified as an invitee, the occupier owes him
ps Freedman J.A . in Barley v. City of Brandon (1967), 61 D.L.R . (2d)
155 (Man. C.A.), at p. 159.
"White v. Imperial Optical Co ., supra, footnote 10.s' Friedmann, op. cit., footnote 29 ; Paton, The Responsibility of an
Occupier to Those Who Enter As of Right (1941), 19 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
I MacDonald and Leigh, op . cit., footnote 29 .
"MacLenan v. Segar, [19171 2 K.B . 325 ; Brown v. B. & F. Theatres,
[19471 S.C.R . 486, 3 D.L.R. 593, per Rand J., at p . 596 (D.L.R.) .
"Sinclair v. Hudson Coal Co., [1966] 2 O.R . 256 (C.A.) per bellyJ.A . (no negligence found) ; Richardson v. St. James Court Apartment,
[19631 1 O.R . 534, 38 D.L.R. (2d) 25, per Aylen J. (no negligence found) ."Hillman v . Macintosh, supra, footnote 21 ; Arendale v. Federal Build-ing, [19621 O.R. 1053, 35 D.L.R . (2d) 202 (C.A .) .
'Excelsior Wire Rope Co . v. Callan, [1930] A.C. 404.
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a duty to "use reasonable care to prevent damage from unusual
danger which he knows or ought to know"." "The foundation of
the law" is said to be "contained in the classic statement" }' of
Mr. Justice Willes in Indermaur v . Dames :
. . . with respect to such a visitor, at least, we consider it settled law
that he, using reasonable care on his part for his own safety, is entitled
to expect that the occupier shall on his part use reasonable care to
prevent damage from unusual danger, which he knows or ought to
know ; and that, where there is evidence of neglect, the question whether
such reasonable care has been taken, by notice, lighting, guarding, or
otherwise, and whether there was contributory negligence in the sufferer,
must be determined by a jury as a matter of fact.
Upon its surface, this simple statement appears to express an
obligation merely to use reasonable care, that is, the ordinary
negligence standard . Dean Prosser has taken it to mean this.'
Some judges, too, have confused this principle with the usual stan-
dard of reasonable care. However, most English and Canadian
judges have not been satisfied with this facile interpretation . In-
stead, they have fastened onto the words "i mtsual danger" and,
as if they were statutory in form, have constructed around them a
body of law that is always confusing, often meaningless, some-
times unjust and totally unnecessary. Hypnotized by the prose of
Justice Willes, the mid-Victorian architect of the law," whom the
"muse has inspired"," they have adhered to the concept of un-
usual danger for over a century without checking its genealogy .
Had they done so, they would have disovered that Justice Willes
mis-stated the law.
Although his Lordship proclaimed that it was "settled law",
the principle he enunciated was not "settled law" at all . Indeed,
no mention of "unusual danger" was made by counsel or by any
of the judges during the argument of the case." Nevertheless,
Justice Willes felt compelled to employ this term in the course
of his opinion on no less than five separate occasions." Elsewhere
in the opinion, Justice Willes claimed that there was "an undoubted
course of authority and practice" to the effect that an occupier
11 Salmond, The Law of Torts (14th ed ., Heuston, 1965), p. 387; Fleet-
ing, op. cit ., footnote 6, p. 420.
as McRuer C.J.H.C . in Gareau v. Charron, [t951] O.R . 280, at p. 284,
[19511 2 D.L.R . 704.
as Supra, footnote 26, at p. 288, and at p. 313 (Ex. Ch.) .
~e Prosser, op . cit ., footnote 33, p. 395.
"Fleeting, op. cit., footnote 6, p. 404.'s Griffith, Duty of Invitors : Norman v. Great Western Railway (1916),
32 L.Q . Rev. 255, at p. 267.as (1866), L.R. 1 C.P. 274, at pp . 278-283 .
"Ibid., at pp. 286 (twice), 287, 288, 289.
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had to use reasonable care "to prevent damage from unusual
danger, of which the occupier knows or ought to know"," but,
strangely, the three cases cited in support of this "undoubted"
authority contain not a whisper of the words "unusual danger". In
fact, in one of the trio, Lancaster Canal v. Parnaby" Justice Tin-
dal stated that "the common law in such a case imposes a duty
on the proprietors [of the canal] . . . to take reasonable care
. . . ,"53 just like a shopkeeper, who is liable for "neglect"
Similarly, in Chapman v. IZothwell," the second case, the court
held that the plaintiff, who fell through a trap door, stated a good
cause by alleging "negligence" and "improper conduct"." The
third case, Southcote v. Stanley," wasnot concerned with an invitee
but with a licensee who was hurt by a glass door in a hotel. The
defendant's demurrer was sustained because the plaintiff failed to
allege that the occupier, though negligent, had knowledge of the
defect . One cannot escape the conclusion that there was no
authority prior to Indermaur v. Dames to support Justice Willes
in so far as he employed the phrase "unusual danger"." On the
contrary, prior to the Indermaur v. Dames decision, the duty to an
invitee was merely to use reasonable care for his protection ."
Despite its questionable ancestry, Indermaur v. Dames has,
over the intervening century, pulled itself up by its own bootstraps
rather remarkably . In one article Professor Griffith waxed poetic
on the scholarly attributes of Justice Willes and the "exact ac-
curacy of the definition"." "If learning, care and skill were ever
applied in formulating a duty", he declared, "they were applied
by Willes J., in Indermaur v. Dames . . ." "[He] who alters one
word of it does so at his peril . . . ," he warned, for Justice Willes
was "too accurate a lawyer and too skillful a draftsman to mean
anything but what he expressed"." Soon after, Justice Middleton
of Ontario cited this article, by "a very careful writer", to justify
11 Ibid., at p. 287.
5? (1839), 11 Ad. & E. 223, 52 R.R . 329 (Ex. Ch.) .
"Ibid., at pp . 243 (Ad. & E.), 335 (R.R .) .
"Ibid., at pp . 243 (Ad. & E.), 336 (R.R .) .es (1858) 27 L.J . (Q.B .) 315. 11 Ibid ., at p. 315 (declaration) .
57 (1856), 1 H. & N. 247, 108 R.R. 549.
Ss Charlesworth, Law of Negligence (1938), pp . 166 and 167 cites
several cases, none of which support him.
'' "Pickard v. Smith (1861), 10 C.E . (N.S .) 470, 128 R.R . 790 "It was
his obvious duty . . . to take reasonable precautions not to injure persons
lawfully on the platform . . ." per Williams J. (Plaintiff, who fell into hole
on railway platform recovered from linsee) .
c° Op. cit., footnote 48 .
61 Ibid., at pp . 256 and 267.
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his reliance on Willes J.'s formulation." More recently, Justice
Spence of the Supreme Court of Canada explained that Justice
Willes "outline of liability has been accepted universally since the
day it was pronounced"," and it has been termed "classic" at
least once." Eminent scholars such as Professors Fleming," Fried-
mann," and Salmond" have succumbed and even Sir Frederick
Pollock felt that the duty was so "carefully indicated by Willes J.
that little remains to be said on that score" ." Only Sir Percy Win-
field seemed to recognize that there had been no earlier decision
on the issue and that Indermaur v . Dames was a new "starting
point" ."
Since its illegitimate birth, this rule has produced confusion
rather than clarity. Professor Friedman assailed the "unnecessary
and, in some respects, unfortunate specialization"," and Justice
MacDonald bemoaned the difficulty of applying the concept in a
changing world." in the same case an unusual danger may be
described as an "unexpected danger"" or simply as "a danger",
without any descriptive adjective." In another unusual danger case
one may meet the terms "concealed danger"," "trap"" or the
unadorned noun "danger"." On occasion a court will cite Inder-
maur v . Dames and then go on to hold that the invitor was obliged
to "use reasonable care to make the premises reasonably safe for
invitees"," which was not what Justice Willes had said at all . Even
the Supreme Court of Canada has been guilty of unconsciously
blurring the duty owed to an invitee, as in Hillman v . Maclntosh," s
"Westenfelder V. Hobbs Manufacturing (1925), 57 D.L.R . 31 (Ont .
C.A.), at p . 34 .
83 Supra, footnote 19, at p . 92 (S.C.R . ) : see also Buckley L.J . in Nor-
man v. Great Western Railway, [1915] 1 K.B . 584, at p. 592 .
"Hesse v. Laurie (1962), 38 W.W.R . 321, at p. 327 (S.C . Alta) .es Op. cit ., footnote 30, p . 420 . " Op . cit . . footnote 29, at p. 78 .
87 Op . cit ., footnote 43, p. 387 ("a carefully worded passage") .
"The Law of Torts (1886), p . 416 .
"Textbook of the Law of Torts (1937), p. 590, (17th ed., 1963,
Jolowicz and Lewis), p . 278 .
"° Op. cit ., footnote 29, at p . 78 .
71 Bennett v. Dominion Stores (1961), 30 D.L.R . (2d) 266, at p . 270
(N.S .S .C .) .
72 Lennie v . Etobicoke, 11943] O.W.N . 622, per Lovering Co. Ct. J .,
at p . 623 .71 Ibid., per Robertson C.J.O ., at p. 625.
"Bay-Front Garage v . Evers, [1944] S.C.R. 20, 1 D.L.R. 433 rev'ing,
[1943] O.W.N . 179, per Davis J ., at p . 23 (S.C.R .) and per Kellock J.A.,
at p . 183 (O.W.N.) .
7-1 Ibid ., per Fisher J.A., at p . 182 (O.W.N.) .
"Ibid ., per Robertson C.J ., at p. 180 (O.W.N.) .
77 Noble v . Hudson's Bay Co ., [1946] 3 W.W.R. 58, [1947] 1 D.L.R.
387, at p. 391 (Alta .) .
78 Supra, footnote 21, at p, 389.
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for example, where Justice Rand, with Justice Judson concurring,
stated that "the duty . . . was one of personal responsibility to see
that reasonable care was exercised to maintain in proper condition
this [elevator] ." Justice Martland, with Justices Locke and Cart-'
wright concurring, quoted from Indermaur v._ Dames, held that
there was an unusual danger and then, gratuitously, stated that the
premises were "not reasonably safe"."
Not only has there been verbal incoherence, but there have
been substantive inconsistencies. Ice and snow, for example, has
been classified as an unusual danger by some courts," while others
have held the opposite." An object on the floor of a department
store may sometimes be an unusual danger" and other times it
may not be," and conflicting cases may also be found that deal
with stairways" and trap doors." It is no small wonder that judges
have complained bitterly116 and that authors have described the law
as "uncertain," "illogical" and "inadequate" ."
Moreover, as a result of these cases, some incredible anomalies
may now exist. It has been suggested that snow and ice cannot be
an "unusual danger" in a Canadian winter, but there is no hint
anywhere that it could not amount to a "concealed danger" or
"trap" . If this were so, a licensee, who is normally entitled to less
care than an invitee, might recover, while an invitee, who is owed
more care, would be denied recovery . This cannot be so! Futher-
more, despite the historic protection accorded it, _a municipality
might be held liable for gross negligence in failing to clear ice and
snow from the highway," while a private business in similar cir-
cumstances might escape liability. This cannot be right either!
"Ibid., at p. 392.
"Levy v . Wellington Square, [1965] 1 O.R. 289, 47 D.L.R. (2d) 567
(Ont . C.C .J .) ; Smith v . Provincial Motors (1962), 32 D.L.R . (2d) 405
(N.S .S.C .) ; Farley v . City of Brandon (1966), 61 D.L.R . (2d) 155 (Man .
C.A .) ; Joubert v. Davidner (1967), 64 D.L.R . (2d) 322 (Sask. Q.B .) .
"Such v . Dominion Stores, [1963] O.R . 405, 37 D.L.R. (2d) 311
(C.A.) ; Sanders v . Shatter (1964), 43 D.L.R . (2d) 685 (B.C.S.C.) .
"Diedericks v . Metropolitan Stores Ltd . (1957), 20 W.W.R. (N.S .)
246, 6 D.L.R. (2d) 751 (Sask . Q.B .) (plastic toy) .
"Rafuse v. T. Eaton Co . (1958), 11 D.L.R. (2d) 773, at p . 775 (N.S.-
S.C .) (stroller) ; Eddie v. Hudson's Bay Co . (1966), 53 D.L.R . (2d) 5
(B.C .S.C .) (stroller) .
"Campbell v . Shelbourne Hotel, [19391 2 K.B . 534 ; cf . Lucy v . Baw-
den, [1914] 2 K.B . 318 ; Wilkinson v . Fairrie (1862), 1 FI . & C . 633, 130
R.R . 700.
fis Indermaur v. Dames, supra, foonote 26 ; Hugget v . Meyers, [19081
2 K.B . 278 (no liability) .
"Chief Justice 11sley in Smith v . Provincial Motors, supra, footnote 80,
at p . 411 .
"Angus MacDonald, op. cit., footnote 29, at p. 365 .
"Municipal Act, R.S.O ., 1960, c . 249, s . 443 (4) .
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Let us now explore in more detail what the Canadian courts have
done in practice with this dismal legacy of the Victorian era.
2. What the Courts Have Done.
The Canadian judiciary has attempted to breath some meaning
into this doctrine . Once it is decided that the entrant is an invitee,
four additional questions must be asked: First, was there an un
usual danger? Second, did the defendant know or have reason to
know about it? Third, did the defendant act reasonably? Fourth,
did the plaintiff use reasonable care for his own safety or did he
voluntarily incur the risk?" It is upon the first step only, that of de-
ciding whether there was an unusual danger, that this discussion
will concentrate.
The term unusual danger has been held to be a "relative" one,
depending upon the kind of premises involved and the class of
persons who normally visit them." Courts have also agreed that it
is an objective notion, rather than a subjective one, as was pre-
viously thought to be the case." Perhaps the most concise judicial
declaration was that of Justice Vincent C. MacDonald in MacNeil
v. Sobey's Stores:` "Unusual danger is a term of relation ; for
danger may be unusual having regard to the nature of the premises
or the class of persons to whom the invitee belongs"." There is
merit in examining these factors. No one expects a coal mine or
a construction site to be kept safe enough for frolicking society
matrons, for the burden upon the enterprise would be too great.
On the other hand, an office building or department store, that is
regularly visited by such ladies, might well be required to measure
up to this standard .
By utilizing this test, our courts have included in the realm of,
unusual dangers, a plastic toy," a strawberry" or a broken bottle
of onions on store floors" and a broken bottle of Cheez Whiz on
s9 See Smith V . Provincial Motors, supra, footnote 80, at p . 412 (I1sley
"Rafuse v. T. Eaton Co ., supra, footnote 83 ; Fiddes v. Rayner Con-
struction (1964), 45 D.L.R . (2d) 367 (N.S.S.C.) .
9i Fiddes v. Rayner Construction, ibid. ; Campbell v. Royal Bank, supra,
footnote 19 . Cf. Portelance v. Trustees of R.C. School Board, [19621 O.R .
365 (C.A.) .
92 (1961), 29 D.L.R. (2d) 761 (N.S .S .C .), at pp. 762-763.
"Swan v. C.P.R . (1959), 19 D.L.R . (2d) 51 (B.C.C.A.), at p. 59.
9" Diedericks v. Metropolitan Stores, supra, footnote 82 .
°s MacNeil v. Sobey's Stores, supra, footnote 92 .
"Bennett v. Dominion Stores, supra, footnote 71 .
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a shelf." Similarly, a rock falling in a quarry," excess wax on a
floor" and an open elevator shaft"B have been so found. A cavity
at the top end of an old-fashioned escalator is an unusual danger .'.
as are bricks falling from the ruins of a neighbouring building."'
A platform on a stairway coloured in a way that was indistinguish-
able from the floor.'. and an unsteady pillar that contained a
light on a dance floor in a hotel gave rise to liability. "'4 So too, a
plank in a tobacco drying kiln"' as well as ice and snow have been
held unusual dangers."'
In many other cases, however, the courts have refused to find
that there was an unusual danger involved and the plaintiff's claim
was prematurely extinguished . A stroller on a department store
floor, for some strange reason, has been twice held not unusual."'
Nor are other "inanimate" objects such as chairs, tables and "ani-
mate objects such as young children" considered unusual."' Like-
wise, a slippery floor,"' a puddle,"' hawthorn branches near a
schoolyard,"' slush on a beverage room floor... and a tiny hole
in the floor"' did not qualify. So too, unsupported sheets of roofing
material on an unfinished shopping center,"' a glass door in a
"Nernberg v . Shop Easy Stores (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 741 (Sask .
C.A .) (conceded) ; Anderson v. A . & p . Tea Co., [1952] O.W.N . 323, 4
D.L.R. 760 (C.A .) (baskets and tinned foods fell on plaintiff) .
s' Fiddes v . Rayner Construction, .supra, footnote 90.
"Creighton v . Delisle Union Hospital (1961), 38 W.W.R . 44, 34
D.L.R . (2d) 606 (Sask. Q.B .) .
"'Hillman v . Maclntosh, supra, footnote 21 .
.' . Cameron v. David Spencer, [1940] 2 W.W.R., 273, 55 B.C.R . 167,
[1940] 3 D.L.R. 286 (C.A.) .
."Mitchell v. Johnstone Walker Ltd ., [1919] 3 W.W.R . 24, 47 D.L.R.
293 (Alta) .
.'s Jackson v. Chow, [19461 2 W.W.R . 16, [1946] 2 D.L.R . 471 (Sask.
C.A.) .
'04 Fetherston v. Nelson and King Edward Hotel, [1944] O.R . 470,
[1944] 4 D.L.R . 292, rev'ed in part, [19441 O.R. 62 (C.A.) .
`McNeil v. Barta and Verbruggi (1958), 15 D.L.R . (2d) 91 (Ont .
S.C.) .
."Smith v. Provincial Motors, supra, footnote 80; Levy v. Wellington
Square, supra, footnote 80 .
.'' Rafuse v . T. Eaton Co ., supra, footnote 83 ; Eddie v . Hudson's Bay
Co., supra, footnote 83 .
."See Verchere J.'s dictum in Eddie v . Hudson's Bay Co., ibid., at p .
10.
.'e Openshaw v . Loukes (1957), 21 W.W.R . 378 (B.C.S.C .) .
"'Nelson v. Lithwick, [1957] O.W.N. 41 .. . . portelance v. Trustees of R.C. School Board, supra, footnote 91 .
312 Cosgrove v. Busk (1967), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 425 (Ont. C.A.) .. .s Arendale v. Federal Building, supra, footnote 41 .
114 Foster and Robillard v. C . A . Johannsen & Sons, [1963] S.C.R . 637,
43 D.L.R . (2d) 493 aff'ing [19621 O.R . 343, 32 D.L.R . (2d) 261 .
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restaurant"' and a door closing slowly on a child's finger . . . were,
held to be usual in the circumstances there involved . Ice and snow
on the steps of a motel in Cache Creek, British Columbia"' or on
the parking lot of a supermarket in Ontario"' in the middle of the
winter were also said not to be unusual dangers .
Professor Harris, in an extremely perceptive article, has sug-
gested that : "The duty to an invitee seems now to be merely an
application in the circumstances of the broad rules of negligence
law"."" Without doubt, the mental exercise engaged in by judges
does resemble the approach in a negligence case, but, alas, there
are recognizable differences also . On occasion, for example, a
court reaches the conclusion that, although he has created an un-
usual danger, the occupier has exercised reasonable care, with
regard to eliminating it or warning about it .'` °
In determining whether conduct is unreasonable, judges and
juries have always balanced the chance of harm and the seriousness
of the danger threatened with the economic burden to reduce that
risk.'' Whatever verbal tests or legal theories are invoked this
weighing process cannot be avoided . To rule that a coal mine must
be made safe enough to receive children might be oppressive, yet
to require that a nursery school be kept this safe would not ; this
is because children would seldom, if ever, be encountered in a
coal mine, while the nursery would be visited almost exclusively
by children . In the latter situation, the game is worth the candle,
but it is not in the former . The only trouble with this balancing
test, however, is that our courts do not opetdy use it in deciding
these invitee cases . On the surface, they first purport to determine
whether there is an unusual danger and, then, they begin the
balancing process to assess whether reasonable care in the cir-
cumstances was employed to remove it or to warn of its presence .
Thus an invitee must leap over two hurdles, instead of the one he
would have to overcome if ordinary negligence principles were
used .
Moreover, the court decides whether there is an unusual danger
as a question of law, rather than the jury deciding it as a question
"IBurke v. Ratcules (1962), 33 D.L.R . (2d) 544 (Ont. C.A .) ; see also
Sullivan v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co . (1966), 185 So . 2d 336.
"s ~17wynne v. Dominion Stores (1964), 43 D.L.R . (2d) 290 kMan .
Q.13 .) .
"'Sanders v. Schatter, supra, footnote 81 .
'"Such v. Dominion Stores, supra, footnote 81 .
"'See op. cit., footnote 29, at p. 429.'s° For example, Bennett v. Dominion Stores, supra, footnote 71 .
"' See Fleming, op . cit ., footnote 6, p. 118 .
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of fact."' In other words, when a court decides that there was no
unusual danger, the result is that there is no duty owed to the
entrant at all. The question of negligence becomes superfluous,
and the claimant never gets to the jury. Another result is that the
case may become so complicated that counsel, in frustration, give
up the right to jury trial."' Even where the jury is dispensed with,
judges are not agreed upon how one proves the quality of un-
usualness. Some courts will take judicial notice that certain dan-
gers are usual,"' while others insist upon evidence to be adduced
by the plaintiff as to its unusual quality."' One Canadian judge,
seemingly oblivious to this problem, was prepared to find simply
that the presence of an unusual danger might be "demonstrated
by what actually happened".126
Nevertheless, when one examines the Canadian decisions
closely, one may discern that the balancing process is being under-
taken tacitly, despite the word formulae recited by the courts . For
example, one factor for which the courts have shown concern is
the economic burden that must be shouldered by occupiers in
keeping their premises reasonably safe . One judge remonstrated
that "it would be unreasonable to expect the defendants to employ
a corps of people to be strewn throughout their shop to mop up
any dampness or moisture or drippings from umbrellas"."' In
another case, Justice Spence of the Supreme Court of Canada
placed some reliance upon "the ease by which the occupier might
avoid [the danger]",128 and, since a few strips of matting would
have cured the problem, he was prepared to impose liability
"because the danger could have been prevented by these economi-
cal and easy precautions" . 129 In the same vein, a court may be
impressed by the fact that there was little difficulty in clearing
what was not a heavy snowfall from the night before."' Justice
"'See generally, Weiner, The Civil Jury and the Law-Fact Distiction
(1966), 54 Cal. L . Rev. 1867 .
123 No fewer than thirty-one jury questions were thought necessary in
an unreported case brought to my attention by B. D . Raphael Esq., Toron-
to, Mulchrone v . Jones (1967), Co . Ct ., County of York.
124 Rafuse v. T. Eaton Co ., supra, footnote 83 .
"s See Justice Ritchie in Campbell v. Royal Bank, supra, footnote 19,
at p . 91 (S.C.R .) .
128 Mitchell v. Johnstone Walker, [1919] 3 W.W.R . 24, (1919), 40
D.L.R . 293 (Alta.) (neighbouring wall fell down).
12' Witt v. David Spencer, [1935] 2 W.W.R . 644, 50 B.C.R. 35, at p. 35 .
128 Campbell v. Royal Bank, supra, footnote 19, at p . 96 (S.C.R.) .
12 ' Relied upon in Farley v . City of Brandon, supra, footnote 80.
la° Levy v . Wellington Square, supra, footnote 80, at p . 293 (O.R.) .
846
	
THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [VOL . XLV
Ilsléy, in Smith v. Provincial Motors,"' was influenced by the ease
with which the ice could be removed and declared that the
"[r]emoval of the danger would have been easy-the application
of a little salt and sand would have removed it . . .".
Another factor which seems to weigh heavily with the court
is the number of persons exposed to the risk . Where many people
are endangered, the chance of harm increases proportionately
and more care may be exacted. Justice Spence, in Campbell v.
Royal Bank of Canada," seemed to stress the fact that the "public
resorted [to the bank] in large numbers", and that it was a "busy
day . . . in a large bank in a city of 30,000, in mid-afternoon
. . ." .1 .. This factor also affected the court in Levy v. Wellington
Square,"' where "at this particular location there are many persons
using this entrance", and in Bennett v. Dominion Stores, where
"large numbers of customers must pass". '35
The type of person injured may also be important . For ex-
ample, ordinary customers in a bank,"' a trucker on a construction
site"' and a delivery man in a factory' . . are accorded substantial
protection, for they are relatively helpless in the circumstances
because of a lack of familiarity with the dangers. On the other
hand, a window cleaner,"' a carpenter in an unfinished house,"'
the owners inspecting an incomplete shopping centrel" and an
adult woman used to logging camps'' are not as well protected
for they are better able to look after themselves . The defendant's
conduct should be judged in the light of the type of persons he
expects to enter his premises . One who invites or expects ladies,
children and deliverymen to enter his premises must govern him-
self accordingly; one who has no reason to expect such persons
upon his land should not be expected to act as if he did. This think-
ing is, of course, consistent with general negligence principles, as it
should be . However, to judge whether a danger is unusual in rela-
tion to a particular plaintiff and his individual knowledge thereof
131 Supra, footnote 80, at p . 412 . See also Joubert v . Davidner, ibid ., at
p . 332 .
133 Supra, footnote 19, at p . 93 (S.C.R .) .
~ 33 1bid ., at p. 96 (S.C.R.) .'a~ Supra, footnote 80, at p. 293 (shopping centre) .'a3 Supra, footnote 71, at p . 270 (supermarket) .
Campbell v . Royal Bank, supra, footnote 19 .taz Fiddes v . Rayner Construction, supra, footnote 90.
133 Hillman v . Macintosh, supra, footnote 21 .. .. Christmas v . General Cleaning, [19521 1 K.B . 141, [19521 1 All E.R.
39 ; Bates v . Parker, [19551 2 Q.B . 231, [19551 1 All E.R . 768 .
Gareau v. Charron, supra, footnote 44, at p . 284 (O.R .) .,at Foster and Robillard v. C . A . Johannsen & Sons, supra, footnote 114.
'°° Sanders v . Schauer, supra, footnote 81 .
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flies in the teeth of general negligence principles . Yet, for many years
Canadian courts followed London Graving Dock v. Horton,"' to
the effect that a danger is unusual to one who has knowledge of it,
until finally, they saw the light and brought the question of notice
into line with their other progressive pronouncements on volenti
non fit injuria. " In these invitee cases, the defendant should be
judged solely by reasonableness in the circumstances and then,
but only then, should the conduct and knowledge of the individual
plaintiff be considered in deciding whether his recovery should be
denied on the basis of voluntary assumption of risk or merely re-
duced because of his contributory negligence .
Another matter that is considered by courts is the seriousness
of the damage threatened. A tiny hole,"' a bit of snow,"' a
puddle"' or some slush... did not generate liability, while a gaping
elevator shaft,"' falling bricks"' or rocks... and a dangerous hole
in an escalator"' did. The courts have alluded, on occasion, to the
importance of the degree of danger in their deliberations, as in the
Campbell v. Royal Bank... case, where the trial judge found that
there was a "dangerous glaze of water" at the wicket . Similarly,
Justice MacDonald, in Bennett v. Dominion Stores,"' stressed the
extra danger to shoppers who were distracted by the displays of
goods in modern self-service stores .
In deciding these cases most courts have stressed the import-
ance of the facts and the circumstances of the case being decided.
Chief Justice Ilsley, for example, struck by the "variations or modi
fications of the rule", pointed out, in Smith v. Provincial Motors,"'
that the cases are reconcilable on the basis the "duty is correctly
stated in every case having regard- to the facts in that particular
case". In addition, Justice MacDonald of British Columbia added
his voice to the chorus âeclaring that, in determining if there is an
... Foster and Robillard v . C . A . Johannsen & Sons, supra, footnote
114, at p. 496 .
.44 Campbell v. Royal Bank, supra, footnote 19. Cf. Car & General In-
surance Co . v. Seymour, (19561 S.C.R . 322 .
"I Arendale v. Federal Building, supra, footnote 41, at p. 202 .
.46 Such v . Dominion Stores, supra, footnote 81 .... Nelson v. Lithwick, supra, footnote 110 .
.4s Cosgrove v. Busk, supra, footnote 112 ..4' Hillman v. Macintosh, supra, footnote 21 .
"Mitchell v . Johnstone Walker, supra, footnote 126..s. Fiddes v . Rayner Construction, supra, footnote 90 ... . Cameron v. David Spencer, supra, footnote 101 .
153 Supra, footnote 19, at p . 93 (S.C.R.) .
'"Supra, footnote 71 ; see also McNeil v . Sobey's Stores, supra, foot-
note 92, at p. 763 ."' Supra, footnote 80 .
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unusual danger, each case must be "considered on its own special
facts" .''6 These pronouncements add weight to the view that the
issue of unusual danger is not and should not be treated as a
question of law for the court, but as a negligence issue for the
jury .'''
The ice and snow cases are perhaps the best test of this ap-
proach for they seem to wander aimlessly in a non-man's land,
sometimes being unusual dangers and other times not . For ex
ample, in Levy v . Wellington Square,"" the court explained that,
although some authority indicated that ice and snow was not un-
usual in a Canadian winter, in this "particular location", where
snow was covering ice beneath it, it was an unusual danger . So
too, in Smith v . Provincial Motors,'" a thin film of ice, in the form
of a stream between eight and twelve inches wide and the same
colour as the asphalt-paved car lot except for a slight shine, was
held unusual in the circumstances . On the other hand, in Such v.
Dominion Stores,"' the small patch of ice on the supermarket
parking lot was not felt to be unusual in the circumstances, though
Justice Schroeder's language, if read indiscriminately, might lead
one to the conclusion that ice and snow can never be held un-
usual in Canada . Of course, there cannot be any general legal rule
dictating whether a danger is unusual or not and, indeed, there
should not be . Circumstances vary and the results of the cases
must alternate accordingly . To fashion a concept of unusual danger
that gives the appearance of being a legal rule to govern all ice
and snow cases does not help but only misleads .
It is time to discard once and for all the concept of unusual
danger . It originated when a great judge mis-stated the law, it lifted
itself up by its own bootstraps and hung on miraculously for a
century . The Americans, because they had adopted the English
law prior to 1866, never accepted the, heresy of Justice Willes and
the English scrapped the concept years ago . If the Canadian courts
do not wish to abandon the notion directly by judicial legislation,
they can revert to the original pre-Willes standard of reasonable
care or they may choose to follow certain statements in the
Supreme Court of Canada to the effect that reasonableness is the
test."' This would simplify things, for the facts of each case could
rss Cameron v. David Spencer, supra, footnote 101, at p. 288.
Contra ; Lord Norman in London Graving Dock V. Horton, [1951]
A.C . 737, at p. 751.
''$Supra, footnote 80, at p. 571 (D.L.R .) .
'"Supra. footnote 80 . "'Supra, footnote 81 .rst Hillman v. MacIntosh, supra, footnote 21, at p. 389, per Rand J. and
at p, 392 "The premises [were] not reasonably safe".
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then be put to the jury or to the trial judge to decide if the oc-
cupier was reasonable in the circumstances. The jury or judge
would then balance the cost to the defendant and the risk to en-
trants, by looking inter alia at the type of premises, the number
and class of people who normally enter, the seriousness of the
harm threatened and the cost of avoiding it . Then, if it is felt that
the occupier had acted in a substandard way, the conduct of the
particular plaintiff should be examined to see if he voluntarily as-
sumed the risk or whether he was contributorily negligent, which
operation should be kept separate and not combined with the duty
issue. If this ,were done, Justice MacDonald's prophecy to the effect
that "changes in merchandising will produce ultimate changes in
the governing law . . ." of occupiers liability would become a
reality."" No one doubts that "there has been an increasing tendency
in the courts to give a broader interpretation to what conditions
constitute `unusual danger' . . . .»16sA
II. Products Liability .
The Canadian manufacturing industry has been transformed dra-
matically in the last few decades,"" but the Canadian law of prod-
ucts liability has not kept abreast of these sweeping changes.
True, the rule of no liability without privity has been replaced by
the rule that negligent manufacturers of products may be respon-
sible to persons not in privity with them, but this result, which
Lord Abinger termed "the most absurd and outrageous conse-
quences" over a century ago, did not come easily nor swiftly."'
Various exceptions had to be fashioned over the decades by courts
unhappy with the status quo; for example, where the defendant
had knowledge of a defect or where the product involved was
"inherently dangerous", tort liability could be imposed."' But this
sorry state of affairs could not long endure in a burgeoning indus-
trial society and in 1916 Justice Benjamin Cardozo of the New
York court of Appeals in MacPherson v. ,wick Motors,"' ex-
16a Bennett v . Dominion Stores, supra, footnote 71, at p. 270."" Joubert v. Davidner, supra, footnote 80, at p. 330, per Disbery J.
lsa Since the middle of the depression thb value of goods manufactured
in Canada has increased tenfold to twenty-five billion dollars worth, Canada
Year Book (1966), p. 675. I am grateful to Michael O'Keefe of the
British Columbia Bar, for his assistance on this part of the article .164 Ylrinterbottom v. Wright (1849), 10 M. & W. 109, at p. 114, 152 E.R .
402, at p. 405.
166 See Prosser, op. cit ., footnote 33, p. 659; see also Ross v. Dunstall
(1921), 62 S.C.R . 393, 63 D.L.R . 63 ; IVokes v . Kent Co . (1913), 23O.W.R. 771, 9 D.L.R . 772; Stalleybrass, Dangerous Things and Non-
Natural User (1927-29), 3 Camb. L.J. 376.166 (1916), 217 N.Y . 382, 111 N.E. 1050 .
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panded the second exception so as to include "anything which
would be dangerous if negligently made". It took sixteen more
long years for MacPherson v. Buick Motors, to win the imprimatur
of the English House of Lords and thereby to assure itself of
universal acceptance in Canada."' It is a virtually unknown and
unheralded fact that eleven years earlier, the Canadian Supreme
Court had already learned of the existence of MacPherson v .
Buick Motors and cited it in a decision ."' Unfortunately, how-
ever, the Supreme Court did not recognize the full purport of the
MacPherson decision and treated it merely as another instance of
the "inherently dangerous" exception . The House of Lords, in
1932, demonstrated that it understood fully the significance of the
MacPherson decision and laid down the principle of Donoghue v .
Stevenson that is still the heart of products liability law throughout
the entire Commonwealth . Lord Atkin formulated the rule thus :'"
A manufacturer of products which he sells in such a form as to show
that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in
which they left him with no reasonable possibility of intermediate ex-
amination, and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care
in the preparation of putting up the products will result in an injury
to the consumer's life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take
that reasonable care .
Upon the foundation of Donoghue v. Stevenson there has been
erected a new body of law that has continually improved the posi-
tion of the Canadian consumer. This development, however, has
been abortive . In the United States, where it all began, products
liability law has undergone another metamorphosis to a regime of
strict liability, which Dean Prosser, who is not normally given to
superlatives, has described as "the most rapid and altogether spec-
tacular overturn of an established rule in the entire history of the
law of torts"."' Yet, Canadian courts and counsel seem totally ob-
livious to this, despite the fact that most of the manufactured goods
produced in Canada are fabricated by subsidiaries o£ American cor-
porations which,"" paradoxically, receive less protection against
"s' Donoghue v. Stevenson, [19321 A.C . 562 ."ss Ross v. Dunstall, supra, footnote 165 .
Donoghue v . Stevenson, supra, footnote 167, at p. 599 ; See Heuston,
Donoghue v . Stevenson in Retrospect (1957), 20 Mod . L . Rev . 1 ; Under-hay, Manufacturers Liability ; Recent Developments of Donoghue v . Steven-son (1936), 14 Can. Bar Rev . 283 .
"vo See op . cit., footnote 11, at pp . 793-794 ; See also Franklin, WhenWorlds Collide : Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-ProductCases (1966), 18 Stan L . Rev. 974 ; Kessler, Products Liability (1967), 76Yale L.J. 887 .
"I See on this problem generally Gordon, A Choice for Canada (1966) .
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civil liability in their homeland than they do in Canada . In the next
decade, Canadian tort law must choose whether we should em-
brace strict liability to the consumer, reject it outright, or whether
we should sit back and let the English House of Lords in the
course of time decide the matter for us, as they did before over
three decades ago.
1 . The Reach of Donoghue v. Stevenson.
a) Who may sue?
In describing the range of claimants to whom the manufac-
turers owed the new privity-less duty of care, Lord Atkin used
the term "consumers" or "ultimate consumers"."' During the in
tervening years, as might have been prophesied, this vague term
has been stretched to cover a wide assortment of potential claim-
ants . Obviously, any actual "purchasers" of a product would enjoy
the, protection ; where someone buys a bottle of soda pop in a
restaurant,". a drugstore,"" a cigar store" or from some other
retailer,"' he may launch an action, not only against the seller,
but against the manufacturer of that product. It appears to make
no difference that the person is a gratuitous recipient of the
product"" or a subsequent purchaser from the original buyer.""
Similarly, where the product was purchased indirectly through an
"agent" of the claimant, the duty is still owed as in the case of a
daughter who sent her father to a cafe to buy her a soft drink,"'
a mother who sent her small son to the drug store for some hair
dye "" and a plaintiff whose friend purchased a bottle of beer for
him in a hotel."' The duty extends to any member of the pur-
chaser's family, such as a young child injured by a defective prod-
uct brought by an older sister". . or by his parents"and such as a
... Donoghue v. Stevenson, supra, footnote 167, at p. 599.
. ..Mathews v. Coca Cola, [1944], 2 D.L.R . 355 (Ont . C.A .) ; Corona
Soft Drinks Co . v. Champagne (1938), 64 Que. K.B . 353 .
"'Zeppa v. Coca Cola, [1955] 5 D.L.R . 187 (Ont. C.A.) ."ve Saddlemire v. Coca Cola, [194114 D.L.R . 614 (Ont. C.A.) .
"76 Willis v . Coca Cola, [1934] 1 W.W.R . 145 (B.C.C.A.) ; Shandloff v .
City Dairy, [1936] O.R . 579, [193614 D.L.R . 712 (C.A.) (chocolate milk) .
""Pack v . Warner County (1964), 44 D.L.R. (2d) 215 (Alta C.A.) ."'8 Power v . Bedford Motor Co., [1959] 1 R. 391 (S.C .) .
Yelland v. National Cafe, [1955] 5 D.L.R . 560 (Bask C.A.) ."eo O'Fallen v . dnecto Rapid (Canada) Ltd., [1939] 1 W.W.R. 264,
[19391 1 D.L.R. 805, aff'd [19401 4 D,L.R . 276, [19401 2 W.W.R . 714
(B.C.C.A .) ."s" Varga v. John Labatt Ltd. (1957), 6 D.L.R. (2d) 336 (Ont . S.C.) .
Cf . Lockett v . Charles, [1938] 4 All E.R. 170 (K.B.D .) ."' Arendale v. Canada Bread Co., [1941] 2 D.L.R. 41 (Ont . C.A.) .
"83 Rae v. T. Eaton Co . (1961), 28 D.L.R . (2d) 522 (N.S .S.C.) (no
liability on other grounds) .
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wife injured by an exploding beer bottle purchased by her hus-
band ."' Other members of the household like a char-woman'. '
and a social guest' . ' are also protected.
Occasionally, a court does not evince any concern at all over
whether the claimant is a purchaser, a relative or a member of the
buyer's household,"' indicating that the scope of the duty is even
broader than this . Anyone who is contemplated as a user of the
product or who "takes control" of it is considered to be in the
"same relationship as a consumer ",'$e as is anyone who would rea-
sonably "come in contact with" the product."' Consequently, any
reasonably foreseeable bystander, including anyone lawfully on
the road like a pedestrian,"' a passenger"' or a spectator at a fire-
works display can now sue."' Moreover, plaintiffs by subrogation
including a city that paid workmen's compensation benefits to an
injured employee,"' an insurance company that reimbursed some-
one injured in the elevator of its insured"' and a hospital required
to compensate anyone injured by its defective equipment' s' are
countenanced as legitimate claimants. One judge prophesied that
liability might be imposed upon "an indefinite number of per-
sons""' and the late Chief Justice Porter, of the Ontario Court of
Appeal, accurately summed up the law when he declared that "con-
sumer is not meant in the narrow sense" ."' It is clear that the
term "consumer" now applies to anyone who could be considered
one's "neighbour" in the broadest sense.
's° Swan v. Riddle Brewery, [19421 1 W.W.R . 577, [1942] 2 D.L.R . 446
(Man . K.B .) (no liability on other grounds) .
"'Johnson v. Summers, [1939] 2 D.L.R . 665, [1939] 1 W.W.R. 362
(Man.) .
ass Lock v. Stibor, [1962] O.R. 963, 34 D.L.R . (2d) 704 .
"'Stewart v . Lepage Inc., [1955] O.R . 937.'se Shields v. Hobbs Manufacturing, [1962] O.R . 355, at p . 359, per
Porter C.J.O., aff'd (1962), 34 D.L.R . 307 (S.C.C .) .ias R,ae v. T. Eaton Co., supra, footnote 183, at p . 530 .'so Stennett v. Hancock, [1939] 2 All E.R . 578 .'9' Ibid. (dictum) .
"'Martin v. T. W. Hand Fireworks Co . (1963), 37 D.L.R . (2d) 455
(Ont . S.C .) .
'99 Christie v. Putherbough Construction (1959), 18 D.L.R . (2d) 250
(Ont. S.C .), (no liability on other grounds) .
'94F. X. Drolet Ltde . v. London & Lancashire Guarantee & Accident
Co., [1943] Que. K.B . 511 (no recovery on other grounds) affd [1944] 1D.L.R . 561 (S.C.C .) .
"'Murphy v. St . Catherine's General Hospital (1964), 41 D.L.R . (2d)697 (Ont. S.C .), at p . 707 (dictum) .
'9s Stennett v. Hancock, supra, footnote 190 .
"'Shields v. Hobbs Manufacturing, supra, footnote 188, at p. 359 .
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b) What products?
Virtually every type of product under the sun may now give
rise to liability . Although some of the original statements in the
House of Lords seemed to limit the duty to manufacturers of
"articles of food and drink""' or "articles of common household
use","' others applied it more generally to any "manufactured
products"."' Indeed, Lord Buckmaster, in dissenting, contended
that the principle could not be limited to food alone, and that
" . . . it must cover the construction of every article" including "the
construction of a house" . "If one step, why not fifty?" he warned."'
Without any doubt whatsoever, the fifty steps have been taken over
the intervening years. Defective food products like chocolate
milk,"' bread,"' soda pop," beer,"' and pork. .. and substandard
containers in which food is packaged. . ' may attract liability. The
protection spread to articles that might be subject to intimate bodily
use such as hair dye,"' underwear,"' other clothing,"' bath salts,"'
perfume,"' combs for hair,"' cigarettes,"' surgical equipment"'
and the like . When a glue can that popped open unexpectedly,".
a defective oil pump,"' weed spray,"' automobiles,"' an elevator,""
Donoghue v . Stevenson, supra, footnote 167 .
' 99 Ibid ., at p . 583, per Lord Atkin .
200 Ibid ., at p . 599.
201 Ibid ., at p. 577 .
202 Shandloff v. City Dairy, supra, footnote 176.
203 Arendale v. Canada Bread, supra, footnote 186.
204 Zeppa v. Coca-Cola, supra, footnote 174 .
205 Varga v. John Labatt Ltd., supra, footnote 181 .
206 Yachetti v . John Duff & Sons, .[1943] 1 D.L.R. 194 (Ont. S.C .) (no
liability on other grounds) .
207Swan v . Riddle Brewery, supra, footnote 184 (no liability on other
grounds) .
208 Watson v. Buckley, [1940] 1 All E.R. 174 (K.B.D.) .
208 Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, [1936] A.C . 85 .
210 La Frumento v. Kotex Co. (1928), 226 N.Y.S. 750 .
"'Levi v . Colgate-Palmolive, [1941] S.R. (N.S.W.) 48 .
212 Carter v . Yardley (1946), 319 '+/lass. 92, 64 N.E. 2d 693 .
213 Smith v. S.S. Kresge Co. (1935), 79 F. 2d 361 .
218 Meditz v . Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co . (1938), 3 N.Y.S. 2d 357 .
215 Murphy v. St . Catherine's General Hospital, supra, footnote 195
(catheter) .
215 Stewart v . Lepage, supra, footnote 187 .
211 Castle v . Davenport-Campbell Co ., [1952] 3 D.L.R. 540 (Ont. C.A.) .
2'8 Ruegger v . Shell Oil, [1964] 1 O.R. 88, 41 D.L.R . (2d) 183 (Ont .
S.C.) .
. ..Marschler v. Masser's Garage (1956), 2 D.L.R. (2d) 484, [1956]
D.R . 328 (Ont.) .
22'Haseldine v . Daw, [1941] 2 K.B . 343, [1941] 3 All E.R . 156, (C.A.) .
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radiators, ..' fertilizer,"' a ladder,..' a stove=} and other chattels-"
yielded tort liability, it became apparent that all other products
would be controlled by tort law's requirement of reasonable care .
Indeed, the only "products" that were able to withstand the
inexorable spread of Donoghue v. Stevenson were houses and
fixtures contained therein. By distinguishing Donoghue v. Steven-
son as dealing with chattels only, the English courts . .. clung to
Malone v. Laskey ... and refused at first to apply the duty of care
to the builder, repairer or vendor of real property . There they dug
in, and only in the last decade have they surrendered to the in-
evitable, by holding a repairer . .. and a builder-.' of real property
liable for their negligence, like anybody else . In Canada, Justice
Adamson of Manitoba, in a strong dictum, had indicated the
foolishness of distinguishing for this purpose between chattels and
realty as early as 1939 : 23° "I can see no reason why the legal
liability for negligently erecting a heavy fixture in a cottage should
be different from negligently erecting a similar fixture in a railway
coach or larger motor bus.""" Refusing to follow the earlier real
property cases, Justice Adamson declared that he was bound by
the Privy Council's decision in Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills
which he felt was indistinguishable."' Nevertheless, the case, in-
volving a hot water radiator which fell on the plaintiff, was dis-
missed on other grounds and this opinion does not appear to have
been followed in later cases. It was only in 1962, when Justice
Richardson, without citing Justice Adamson's dictum, held both
the vendor and the builder of a home containing a defective cup-
board liable to someone injured thereby,"' that it became apparent
that Malone v. Laskey was finally dead .
"'Johnson v. Summers, supra, footnote 185.
222 M,ajorcsak v. Na-Churs Plant Food, [1964] 2 O.R . 38, rev'd on other
grounds, as against manufacturer (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 39 (C.A .) .
22 agalash v. L. A . Ladder Co . (1934), 1 Cal. 2d 299, 34 P. 2d 481.
224 Coakley v. Prentiss-Wabers Stove Co . (1923), 182 Wis. 92, 195 N.W.
3$8.
z" See Prosser, op. cit., footnote 33, p. 662, for others.
121Otto v. Bolton, [1936] 2 K.B . 46, [1936] 1 All E.R . 960.
227 [1907] 2 K.B . 141, See also Bottomley v. Bannister, [1932] 1 K.B .
458.
223 Billings V. Riden, [1958] A.C . 240 (hoarding) .120 Sharpe v. Sweeting, [1963] 2 All E.R . 455 (K.B.D.) (canopy) .
230 Johnson v. Summers, supra, footnote 185.231 Ibid ., at p. 667.
232 Ibid.
233 Lock v. Stibor, supra, footnote 186.
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c) Who may be sued?
The case of Donoghue v. Stevenson... limited itself to the im-
position of liability upon manufacturers and, consequently, the
producers of such varied products as underwear,"' a weed spray,
236
soda pop,"' and a dairy which processed a bottled chocolate
milk"" must observe reasonable care. Liability has also been im-
posed upon a bakery for glass particles discovered in its bread
. .
and upon soft drink producers for such items found therein as a
mouse,"' a chain,"' glass,"' caustic soda" and chlorine."' In one
old case there was an indication that a meat packer might not be
considered a "manufacturer", but this statement is of doubtful
authority to-day."' The duty extends beyond manufacturers. For
example, it is the soft drink bottler who normally bears the tort
liability for foreign objects that emerge from their product, even
where the bottles are purchased from a third party,"' whereas the
producer of Coca Cola syrup is not liable for an explosion of a,
bottle of Coca Cola over which it never had any control."' Similar-
ly, a glue producer was held liable when the top of a glue can
flew off unexpectedly, whereas the maker of the container was
not, since the negligence consisted of the former's failure to
warn..'' In the same way, because the public relies on their ader-
tising, because they have the opportunity to inspect each part for
safety . ' . and because of the difficulty in discovering which one of
the many components is to blame for an accident, assemblers of
automobiles,"' composite surgical instruments like a catheter..
234Supra, footnote 167.
235 Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, supra, footnote 209.2"' Ruegger v. Shell oil, supra, footnote 218 .
2"' Zeppa v . Coca Cola, supra, footnote 174.
231 Shandloff v. City Dairy, supra, footnote 176 .
211 Arendale v . Canada Bread Co., supra, footnote 182.
241 Sdddlemire v . Coca Cola, - supra, footnote 175 ; Mathews v. Coca
Cola, supra, footnote 173 .
241 Corona Soft Drinks Co . v. Champagne, supra, footnote 173 .212 Ferstenfeld v. Kik Cola (1939), 77 Que. S.C . 165 (no liability on
other grounds) .
243 Willis v . Coca Cola, supra, footnote 176 (no liability on other
grounds) .'14 Yarga v . John Labatt, supra, footnote 181 (beer) .
245 Yachetti v . John Duff & Sons, supra, footnote 206 (no liability on
other grounds) .
241 Swan v . Riddle Brewery, supra, footnote 184 .
24' Yelland v. National Cafe, supra, footnote 179.
241 Stewart v . Lepage, supra, footnote 187.
249 Fleming, op. cit ., footnote 6, p . 474 et seq .250 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co ., supra, footnote 166 ; Ford Motor
Co. v. Mathis (1963), 322 F . 2d 26"7.
"'Murphy v . St. Catherine's General Hospital, supra, footnote 195, at
p . .707 .
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and assemblers of other products such as television sets, washing
machines, airplanes and the like labour under this duty . Of course,
if the producer of a specific component part could be proved negli-
gent, he would undoubtedly be held liable to the consumer or he
would be required to idemnify the assembler for any damages the
latter had to pay as a result of the former's fault . 252
The courts have not stopped there, but have placed repairers
as well as producers and assemblers under the obligation to use
care . In his dissent in Donoghue v . Stevenson,"" Lord Buckmaster
pointed out the inevitability of this development if the majority
view prevailed and later courts have, ironically, utilized his dicturll
in visiting liability upon repairers." { For example, in Marschler v .
Masser's Garage.. . a negligent repairer of automobile brakes was
held liable to indemnify its owner for an amount paid in settle-
ment to a third person whom the owner had injured . Justice LeBel
stated'" that, " . . . the repairer of chattels . . . may be, and some-
times is, held liable to persons who are complete strangers to him .
His responsibility may extend to an indefinite number of persons
for indefinite amounts of money over indefinite periods of time for
the person who repairs the brakes of a motor vehicle must be
assumed to know that if his work is done carelessly that vehicle
may cause injury and damage not only to the person with whom
he made his contract to repair, but also to others who may be
passengers in the vehicle or lawfully upon the highway" . Similarly,
repairers of a truck wheel-" and of an elevator were held respon-
sible."'
The duty has been broadened still further . A person who in-
stals a product at its place of use is neither a manufacturer nor a
repairer, yet he, too, must exercise reasonable care . Thus, where
a steam valve was negligently installed in a ship, 2.',9 where an
elevator was improperly set up in a building." and where a radia-
tor was placed in a home,"' civil liability may ensue . Similarly, a
252 Evans v. Triplex Glass, [1936] 1 All E.R . 283 (K.B.D .) (defective
windshield) . But cf . Goldberg v. Kollman Instruments (1963), 191 N.E.
2d 81 where the maker of a defective altimeter was absolved while the air-
plane manufacturer was held .
253 Supra, footnote 167, at p. 577.
251 Haseldine v. Daw, [1941] 2 K.B. 343, per Scott L.J .
255 Supra, footnote 219.
Zss Ibid ., at p. 491 (D.L.R .) .
2'7 Stennett v. Hancock, supra, footnote 190.
z;s Haseldine v. Dativ, supra, footnote 254.25sHoward v. Furness, [1936] 2 All E.R . 781 (K.B.D .) .
2"London & Lancashire v. Drolet, [19441 1 D.L.R. 561 (S.C.C . on
appeal from Quebec) .
"i Johnson v. Summers, supra, footnote 185 (dictum) .
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wholesaler... or a distributor of a product who places his label
upon it... is responsible, even th6ugh he does not participate in
its actual production. Someone who merely recommends the use
of a product without giving adequate warning.. may be caught.
So too, liability may be imposed on one who applies or adminis-
ters a product, as where dangerous spray was applied to cattle,"'
where fertilizer was mixed with a dangerous substance... and where
harmful hair dye was used on the plaintiff."' One court went as
far as to indicate that a customer in a store, injured by an ex-
ploding jar on a shelf, might be able to recover from the store-
keeper on the basis merely of the latter's "control" of the prod-
uct,"' but another court stopped short of making responsible the
waiter who served a bottle of beer containing chlorine, at least
where be had no knowledge of the defect."' The reach of Donog-
hue v. Stevenson, therefore, has been spread far beyond what
could have been contemplated by the Law Lords who fathered it
in furtherance of a policy of consumer protection, but the require-
ment of proof of negligence has hindered the full achievement of
this goal .
2. The Standard of Care .
The standard of care demanded of these Canadian manufac-
turers, distributors, repairers and others is not a strict liability at
all ; they are charged only with the duty to use reasonable care in
the circumstances."' professor Fleming"' has suggested that the
standard has "assumed some characteristics of strict liability . . ."
and professor Alexander,"' has ruminated that, although negli-
gence is relied upon "in theory", "our courts, in these products
liability cases are in fact imposing virtually strict liability" . Un-
happily, this just is not so . Perhaps, by employing devices like res
ipsa loquitur, our courts have tended somewhat in this direction,"'
.. . O'Fallon v. Inecto Rapid, supra, footnote 180.. . . Watson v. Buckley, supra, footnote 208; See also Kubach v. Hol-
lands, [19371 3 All E.R . 907 (K.B.D .) .
. . . Pack v. Warner County, supra, footnote 177 (spray dangerous to
animals) ..es Ibid.as Majorcsak v. Na-Churs Plant Food, supra, footnote 222.a' Watson v. Buckley, supra, footnote 208.. .' Nernberg v. Shop Easy Stores, supra, footnote 97 (alternative holding
on occupier's liability) .. .' Varga v. John Labatt, supra, footnote 181.
" '° Donoghue v. Stevenson, supra, footnote 167..'1 Fleming, op. cit., footnote 6, p. 482; see also p. 474..' . Op. Cit., footnote 23, p. 42.. .. Dunlop, The Law of Torts, in Canadian Jurisprudence (1958), p. 159.
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particularly in the food cases, but proof of fault in the testing, pro-
cessing, packaging and distribution of goods is still required ."'
If a test is not "commercially feasible'12" or if government inspec-
tors authorize the sale of a particular product,"' no liability will
be incurred . By and large, liability will be found where someone
blunders, but not otherwise . Naturally, the custom of the industry
will be given great weight in determining this standard, but it will
not be conclusive."
Manufacturers are subject to a duty to warn consumers about
any dangerous properties of their product. .. whether they are "in-
herent dangers" or "dangers attendant on use"."' Even where a
product is dangerous only to a few people, they must be warned
so that they may test the product before using it, "' but a caution
is unnecessary if the danger is "a mere possibility" ."' All warnings
must be reasonably communicated . To bury the caveat in an ac-
companying brochure will probably not suffice, for, presumably,
people rarely read these pamphlets . The warning should be printed
on the container's label,282 it should be an arresting one and it
should clearly describe the specific danger . "" For example, a
caution to the effect that a certain weed killer should be kept away
from flowers was held inadequate where an invisible spray there-
from floated without any wind for a quarter of a mile and damaged
crops."' The courts have evinced no sympathy at all for the com-
plaint that "sales would be prejudicially affected" by clear warn-
ings .2" A manufacturer is not obligated to give a superfluous warn-
ing however . Consequently, one need not warn that a hammer
can hurt a finger,"' that pork must be cooked,"' that a knife will
cut or that a match will burn . Similarly, where the product is a
highly technical one that will be used only by experts who have
2 .. See generally Fleming, op. cit ., footnote 6, p. 474 et seq .
275 Yachetti v. John Duff, supra, footnote 206, at p . 197 ... .Ibid ., at p . 201 (pork) . 277 Fleming, op . cit., footnote 6, p . 122 .
278 Stexvart v . Lepage, supra, footnote 187 .2"Ruegger v . Shell Oil, supra, footnote 218, per Ferguson J ., at p . 191
(D.L.R.) ; See also Fillmore's Valley Nurseries v . N. American Cyanamid
(1958), 14 D.L.R . (2d) 297 (N.S .S .C .) .
2s° Manson J. at trial in O'Fallon v . Inecto Rapid Canada Ltd ., supra,
footnote 180 (plaintiff sensitive to dye) .
28tRae v, T. Eaton Co., supra, footnote 183, at p. 536 .
282 O'Fallon v . Inecto Rapid, supra footnote 180 ; but cf . Holtnes v .
Ashford, [195012 All E.R . 76 (where warning in pamphlet held sufficient) .
"'Spurting v . Bradshaw, [19561 2 All E.R. 121 (C.A .) at p, 125 .
284 Ruegger v . Shell oil, supra, footnote 218 .
285 grosser, op . cit ., footnote 33, p . 667 ."' Fillmore's Valley Nurseries v . N. American Cyanamid, supra, foot-note 279, at p. 321 .
287 Yachetti v . John Duff, supra, footnote 206, at p. 197.
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full knowledge of it and not by the general public, a caution is
unnecessary."' Thus, a customer need not be warned personally
about a hair dye, if the hairdresser is forewarned."'
In defective food cases, the Canadian courts have indirectly
required more of manufacturers than they have in cases involving
other products . In many of the United States, there were two com
pletely different standards applied to producers of food and to
makers of other products for many years ; food producers were
held strictly liable whereas manufacturers of other items were sub-
ject only to the standard of reasonable care."' In Canada, contrary
to early English authority,"' this dichotomy has been manifested
through a novel employment of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Normally, res ipsa loquitur raises an inference of negligence where
an accident occurs that would not normally transpire unless some-
one was negligent and where the defendant was in control of the
conditions giving rise to the accident,"' but, in the food cases,
Canadian courts have permitted res ipsa loquitur to do more than
merely raise an inference of negligence . Admittedly without refer-
ring specifically to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Chief Justice
Pickup, in Zeppa v . Coca Cola,"' declared that "there is a pre-
sumption of negligence on the part of the manufacturer and a
burden on him of disproving negligence on his part to the satis-
faction of the jury". Soon afterwards, the discovery of chlorine
in a bottle of Labatt's beer was said to raise a presumption which,
apparently, shifts the onus of proof to the defendant."' Nowhere
in either opinion is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur referred to by
name, however, and nowhere was the conflicting case of Interlake
Tissue v. Salmon cited . Justice McPhillips, in a confused split de-
cision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal,"' had earlier .
hinted that res ipsa loquitur might create a "presumption of neg-
ligence" which placed on the defendant an onus "to rebut in the
most complete way the negligence which will otherwise be as-
'" Murphy v. St. Catherine's General Hospital, supra, footnote 195, at
pp . 711-712, per Gale J . dictum .. . . Holmes v . Ashford, supra, footnote 282.
.° 9 Cf. Decker v . Capps (1942), 139 Tex . 609, 164 S.W. (2d) 828 and
MacPherson v . Buick Motor Co., supra, footnote 166 . This distinction has
now been all but swept aside by the victory of strict tort liability to the
consumer, see Prosser, op . cit., footnote 11 .
20' Castle v. Davenport-Campbell, supra, footnote 217, at p. 546.. . .Interlake Tissue Mills v . Salmon, [1948] O.R . 950, [1949] 1 I .L.R .
207 ; See also Fleming, op . cit., footnote 6, p. 277 .
2sa Zeppa v . Coca Cola, supra, footnote 174 .
294 IJarga v. John Labatt, supra, footnote 181 .. .. Willis v. Coca Cola, supra . footnote 176 (trial dismissal upheld when
court split 2-2) .
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sumed . . ." and to "excuse itself or demonstrate that it was in no
way responsible for what happened".296 In Arendale v . Canada
Bread,"" the court had also spoken of an "onus . . . on the defen-
dant to offer a reasonable explanation" and held the defendant
liable because "the evidence falls short of discharging this onerous
burden"."' Earlier in the Arendale decision, however, the court
stated that there was a "prima facie case" if glass were found in a
loaf of bread on delivery, indicating a less stringent view of res
ipsa loquitur than the one taken in Zeppa v. Coca Cola ."' So too,
in Saddlemire v. Coca Cola... the court had defined res,ipsa loqui-
tur as "sufficient evidence to raise a presumption of negligence
which must be rebutted by the defendant" . Nonetheless, before
Zeppa there had been no clear shifting of the onus of proof to the
defendant in Canada, although there had been in England"' and
sometimes in the United States .ao2
To be sure, to permit res ipsa loquitur to shift the onus of
proof to the defendant pollutes its purity as a mere instance of
circumstantial evidence, unworthy of any special name, upon which
the jury may or may not rely ."" But there is no need to place the
doctrine in a straight jacket, for, as Professor Fleming indicates,
res ipsa loquitur may whisper negligence or shout it aloud."'
When foreign objects are found in food products, res ipsa loquitur
is like a trumpet blast and one can fairly decide that this is suffi-
cient evidence of negligence in itself, unless the manufacturer satis-
fies him that this was not the case . Moreover, lacking the courage
to impose directly a strict liability in food cases, our courts have
utilized res ipsa loquitur as a device to afford better protection for
the consumer in a roundabout way.
Another indirect route toward a broader protection for the
consumer, negligence per se or statutory negligence, has been so far
squandered by the Canadian judiciary. Our judicial cupboard is
virtually bereft of any decisions, using by analogy the many crim-
inal statutes that have been passed by legislatures in the products
field, although. in the United States there are dozens of such
296 Ibid ., at p. 167 . 297 Supra, footnote 182.
Z96 Ibid ., at p. 44, per Gillanders J.A. 299 Ibid .
aao ,Supra, footnote 175, at p. 619.
... Moore v. Foe & Sons, [19561 1 Q.B . 596, [19561 1 All E.R . 182;
Winnipeg Electric v. Geel, [19321 A.C . 690, per Lord Wright dictum.
"' Prosser. Res ipsa Loquitur in California (1949), 37 Cal. L. Rev. 183,
at p. 225.30,
Res Ipsa Loquitar. Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper
Canada (1955), p. 103.
6°' Fleming, op . cit., footnote 6, p. 288; Prosser, The Procedural Effect
of Res Ipsa Lognitrrr (1936), 30 Minn . L. Rev. 241.
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cases."' In the distant past one brave Canadian counsel dared to
base a civil action, inter alia, upon a breach of statute, but, alas,
he could not bring his facts within the legislative terns and
failed ."' His descendants have not continued the battle, despite
the fact that much headway might be made with such a weapon.
Part of the difficulty is the foolish wrangle over whether, con-
stitutionally, federal legislation can "create" civil rights."' Yet
this problem would vanish if our courts would only recognize that
criminal violations do not "create" any tort rights, and that they,
themselves, fabricate them by analogy to these statutes ."' Another
impediment has been the temerity of Canadian lawyers to rely
upon available statutory material .
The federal Food and Drug Act, for instance, proscribes any
sale of "an article of food that a) has in or upon it any poisonous
or harmful substance; b) is unfit for human consumption; c) con
sists in whole or part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, de-
composed, or diseased animal or vegetable substance; d) is adulter-
ated; or e) was manufactured, prepared, preserved, packaged or
stored under unsanitary conditions .""' One of the unsolved mys-
teries of Canadian tort law is why breach of this statute has never
been relied upon by a court to affix tort liability, nor why it has
not even been pleaded in any reported decision, despite the fact
that such legislation is commonly used in the United States as a
springboard to widen liability via negligence per se. In the leading
American case of Doherty v. S. S. Kresge . .. the plaintiff, whose
wife had died from food poisoning contracted when she ate an
unwholesome turkey sandwich, recovered tort damages, although
there was no evidence of actual negligence in the selection, prep-
aration and serving of the food . The court rested its decision on
the contravention of a pure food Act which stipulated that "it shall
be unlawful for any person to manufacture, sell, . . . any article of
food which is adulterated . . . unwholesome, poisonous or deleteri-
ous . . ." . Justice Fairchild explained that the statute created "a
species of statutory tort arising out of a failure, however innocent,
to comply with a specific mandate of a statute designed to promote
F
public health and safety . . ." . In another American case, Mesh-
"'See excellent Note, (1966), 64 rich L . Rev. 1388 .aos I'achetti v . John Duff, supra, footnote 206.
3 °' gee Alexander, op . cit., supra, footnote 12 .
" 8 Ibid., See also Prosser, op . cit ., footnote 33, p . 193 .aoe S.C . 1953, c. 38, s . 4. Constitutionally intra vires: Standard Sausage
v. Lee, [19341 1 D.L.R. 706 (B.C.C.A.) .aio (1938), 227 Wis . 661, 278 N.W. 437 .
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besher v . Channellene Oil,"" where an illness resulted from im-
purities in some cooking oil, the court asserted that "negligence is
implied from a violation of the statute ",312 because this was "a
salutary and necessary construction of our pure food statute" with-
out which a cause of action would not be stated."' It should be
emphasized that the court refused to rely on evidence of lack of
knowledge as an excuse . The overwhelming bulk of American
authority is in harmony with these cases."'
There exist other enactments that deal with food and other
products but dust seems to have settled on them as well . For ex-
ample, the Pharmacy Act of Ontario enacts that "No person shall
sell any poison . . . unless the . . . bottle . . . is distinctly labelled
with the name of the article and the word poison", and that no
person shall sell by retail any article in a certain schedule "except
on a prescription . . ." of a qualified person ."' This statute was
considered in a tort case only once long ago, when Justice Britton,
in a dictum,"' hinted that a breach of the section concerning
poison labels might give rise to liability . There is one conflicting
dictum by Justice Greene, in the Yachetti v . John Duff . . case,
evincing an aversion toward civil actions based upon violation of
penal statutes, because "[i]t would be very harsh legislation if so
applied to the circumstances under consideration which it is im-
possible as a matter of practical procedure for the vendor to find
out whether the pork is infected with trichinae or not . The result
would be to prohibit the sale of fresh pork . . . " .
There is no reason why Canadian courts should not hold
violators of pure food legislation civilly liable as most American
courts do. The policy advanced by the enactments, the protection
of consumers from unwholesome food products, is a noble one and
worthy of being buttressed by tort courts and the provision of
reparation for the injured fills a statutory void . An additional
deterrent lash may also spur the producer to greater efforts to con-
31' (1909), 107 Minn . 104, 119 N.W. 428.3' 3 Ibid ., at p. 430, per Chief Justice Smart (N.W.) .
"" Ibid . He also held that it was not necessary to plead the statutory
violation since it is a public law.3"Donaldson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co . (1939), 59 Ga . App.
79, 200 S.E. 498; Culbertson v. Coca Cola (1930), 157 S.C . 352, 154 S.E .
424; Yochern v. Gloria (1938), 134 Ohio St . 427, 17 N.E . 2d 731; contra
Howson v. Foster Beef Co . (1935), 87 N.H . 200. 177 A.656 ; Cheli v.CIudahy (1934), 267 Mich . 690, 255 N.W. 414.
315 R.S.O ., 1960, c. 295, s . 33, 35 s. 39(1) outlines penalties .
"'Antoine v. Dunconrbe (1906), 8 O.W.R. 719. No liability to widow
of Indian who died from drinking unlabelled wood alcohol since Act con
strued not to apply to this and evidence scant .
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shoulder this additional responsibility . It is time for the Canadian
law of products liability to relieve our injured consumers from the
onerous burden of proving fault and to require our manufacturers
to stand behind their defective products .
III. Automobile Accident Compensation .
The resolution of disputes arising out of automobile accidents is
the most important task of tort law to-day, whereas a century ago
such actions were completely unknown. In the early days of the
motor car, the courts treated them like wild beasts for a time, im-
posing strict liability in favour of those injured in collisions . 322 In
one Ontario case, the owner of a shining red roadster with brass
fittings was held civilly liable for an accident that occurred when
a horse took fright at the mere sight of his vehicle parked at the
roadside . Chief Justice Meredith dissented. He felt that motor cars
were "modern means of conveyance" that were used, not only "for
pleasure", but for "business purposes" all over the country and
that they should be entitled to the "same freedom as a wagon,
carriage, cart or less modern vehicle" ."' Another Canadian judge
felt it necessary to proclaim that "the motor is not an outlaw . 9132-1
Gradually, as automobile ownership spread, these views won the
day and motor vehicle liability became a branch of the expanding
field of negligence law. Consequently, a person injured on the
highway was required to establish that the defendant negligently
caused his loss in order to recover from him in tort .
1 . The Present System .
Veering over to fault liability may have been a mistake. As the
toll of those killed and injured on the highways climbed, criticism
of the tort system grew, because many victims, unable to secure a
tort recovery, had to shoulder their own losses . This was so because
some were hurt without fault on the part of anyone, others as a
result of their own fault, still others as a consequence of their
contributory negligence and the balance were unable to prove how
the accident happened . In many cases, although an injured person
could prove that another was to blame for his injury, that otherwas
uninsured and impecunious. Thus, tort rights often became paper
rights only, worth little or nothing in practice . Moreover, as the
322 See Fleming, op . cit., footnote 6, p. 21 ; See also Walton & Co . v.
Vanguard Motor Bus Co . (1908), 25 T.L.R . 13 (K.B.D .) ; Wing v. L.G .-
O.C ., [190912 K.B . 652 (C.A .) .
323 Mclntyre v. Coote (1909), 19 O.L.R . 9 (Div . Ct), at p. 13 .
32-'Marshall v. Gowans (1911), 24 O.L.R . 522 (C.A.), at p. 530.
1967]
	
A Century of Tort Law in Canada 865
volume of accidents rose, more cases had to be litigated and delay
in court ensued . Eventually, concern for the uncompensated victims
of automobile accidents led many to question the propriety of fault
as a basis of loss-shifting and to eye the new .workmen's com-
pensation systems longingly. Others wondered whether a tort trial
could accurately determine what had occurred several years earlier
in a split-second crash."'
The response of tort law itself was disappointing; there was
some stiffening of the standard of care required of motorists, some
relaxation in the requirement of proof of fault, some increased
willingness to use legislative proscriptions as determinative of fault
and some expansion of vicarious liability."' By and large, however,
tort law withstood the pressure of social need. The reaction of our
legislatures, on the other hand, was somewhat more satisfactory;
they began to alter some of the background in which tort law op-
erated, by enacting legislation making owners liable for all damages
occasioned by their vehicles, permitting courts to apportion liability
between a contributorily negligent plaintiff and defendant, re-
quiring insurance policies to contain various statutory conditions,
allowing direct actions against insurers by third persons and pro-
hibiting iniquitous defences such as drunkenness, racing and the
like qua these third persons at least up to basic limits ."' Assisted
by financial responsibility laws, compulsory insurance and such
other devices as the "uninsured motor vehicle fee", the incidence
of private liability insurance soared so that the province of Ontario
could boast that almost ninety eight per cent of its vehicles were in-
sured to basic limits."' Moreover, in order to assure that even the
so-called "black risks" could secure coverage, assigned risk plans
were established by the insurance industry .
325 See generally Ebrenzweig, "Full Aid" Insurance for the Traffic
Victim-A Voluntary Compensation Plan (1954) reprinted (1955), 43 Cal.
L. Rev . 1 ; McRuer, The Motor Car and the Law (1966), 4 Osgoode Hall
L.J . 54 ; Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery : Compensation and
Selective Reimbursement (1967), 53 Va. L . Rev . 774 .
323 Fleming, op . cit., footnote 6, p. 292 .
"'See Ehrenzweig, op . cit., footnote 325, at pp . 11-18 ; Keeton and
O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim : A Blueprint for Re-
forming Automobile Insurance (1965), pp . 76-123 ; and see for example,
Insurance Act, R.S.O ., 1960, c . 190, as am . by S.O., 1966, c . 71, s. 11,
and ss . 204 (statutory conditions), 222 (1) (third party rights), 222 (4)
(no defences) ."s Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, 1961-62, S.O ., 1961-62, c. 84,
s. 2(2) . See, Select Committee on Automobile Insurance, Final Report
(1963), p. 5 ; but see Accident Facts (1965), Ontario Department of
Transport indicating that six per cent of the vehicles involved in accidents,
were actually uninsured . In the Province of British Columbia this latter
figure is three point nine per cent.
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Because there were still some uninsured drivers involved in
accidents, the Province of Manitoba established the first Canadian
"unsatisfied judgment fund" . This government-operated fund
guaranteed the payment of any automobile accident judgment or
part thereof that remained unsatisfied above a minimum and below
a maximum amount . Before long all of the other provinces followed
suit . In addition to Manitoba, New Brunswick, Ontario, Saskatche-
wan and Alberta have government-operated schemes, while New-
foundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Quebec and British
Columbia have systems operated collectively by the private insur-
ance industry . Through various amendments the hit-and-run driver
was covered, the maximum limits were gradually raised to $35,
000.00 inclusive and the procedures were streamlined."' To-day
the problem of lack of compensation due to an uninsured driver
has been virtually obliterated in Canada, except in the rare case
where the loss exceeds the limits of the fund .
Although not directed exclusively at him, a person hurt in an
automobile accident may be assisted by the rather sophisticated
social welfare system that has been erected in Canada."' Even if
he fails to secure any tort recovery, an injured person may still
be reimbursed partially by some non-tort source, either government
or private . With federal aid, provincially run hospital service plans
supply hospital care to virtually every Canadian . Over eighty per
cent of the Canadian population is now covered by some form of
medicare, operated either publicly or privately . In addition to these
two types of coverage, all Canadian provinces have legislation un-
der which they may pay a small pension to a disabled, blind or
any other person who is able to qualify by a means test . Work-
men's compensation legislation, moreover, supplies complete hos-
pital, medical, and rehabilitative care as well as seventy-five per
cent of wages during the period of convalescence for any workman
injured on the job . On the horizon are the disability and survivor-
ship benefits that will be available under the Canadian Pension
Plan . In addition to all this, Canadians are a very heavily insured
people ; vast numbers are covered by life, accident, disability and
other private insurance that can be called into play in case of in-
"'See the Traffic Victims Indemnity Fund Brief to the Royal Com-
mission on Automobile Insurance (B.C .) (1966), p. 1 and Appendix 1 for
a summary of the various provincial plans. In British Columbia the mini-
mum is now $50,000.00."' See Linden, The Report of the Osgoode Hall Study on Compensation
for Victims of Automobile Accidents (1965), c. VI for details and foot-
notes . See also Linden, Automobile Accident Compensation in Ontario-
A System in Transition (1967), 15 Am. 7. Comp . L. 301 .
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jury in a car accident as in any other situation of adversity. One
study has shown that forty per cent of the moneys received in 1961
by Ontario accident victims came from non-tort sources, which per-
centage has undoubtedly climbed since that date, and that eighty-
six per cent of the victims got something from a non-tort source.
Despite this development, the voices calling for reform have
not been stilled . Insurance premiums continue to increase, the
problem of delay has not been solved and many victims are still
not fully compensated. But the problem of soaring insurance rates
is not as much a product of the present system of automobile
accident compensation as it is of to-day's automotive society."'
More cars, more highways and more travel generate more accidents.
Higher repair prices, higher medical costs, and higher incomes
produce higher losses and, therefore, higher damage awards. Be-
cause of the increased accident frequency and cost per claim, the
cost of indemnifying these losses rises and, hence, premiums are
pushed up. To attack this problem by abolishing tort law is to miss
the point; what must be done is to reduce the number of accidents
and the severity of injuries resulting therefrom. By stricter enforce-
ment of rules of the road, by clamping down on drunk driving, by
offering driver education courses, by building safer roads and
crash-proof cars, we may be able to shrink the accident toll. If
this were done, not only would the economic problems be mollified,
but the human suffering would also be diminished . Whatever steps
are taken, however, to avoid accidents, they will never cease to
occur altogether, and, therefore, there will still be a place for the
law of torts.
At long last, statistics are being gathered to demonstrate the
strength and weakness of the present system . For example, the
problem of delay has been shown to exist-only in a few cases. The
vast majority of claims are speedily paid ; seventy-two point eight
per cent of all the insurance claims studied in British Columbia
were settled within sixty days of when the insurer first learned of
the loss."' Where litigation was required, the average time to con-
clude it was one year. In Ontario, the figures demonstrated that
seventy-three point five per cent of the tort settlements were made
within one year after the accident date."' As far as the recovery
... O'Connell, Taming the Automobile (1963), 58 N.W.U.L. Rev. 299;
Linden, The Prevention of Traffic Accidents (1967), 15 Chitty's L.J. 80.
332 Linden, The Processing of Automobile Claims (1967), 34 Ins. Courts .
J. 50, at p. 54.
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ratio is concerned, the British Columbia study disclosed that
seventy-nine point eight per cent of all insurance claims were
paid."' The Report of the Osgoode Hall Study on Compensation
for Victims of Automobile Accidents demonstrated that there was
a tort recovery in only forty-two point nine per cent of the injury
cases, but most of the uncompensated did not attempt to recover
and many were guest passengers who were barred from recovering
by statute in Ontario at that time ."' This has not stopped some
people from citing this data in provinces where there is no ab-
solute bar to actions by guest passengers . Nor has it prevented
others from assailing the insurers because of the large uncompen-
sated loss figures, without carefully studying the basis of the calcu-
lations and the law in force at the time . On the other side, defenders
of the system sometimes point to the bright spots in the data,
ignoring the fact that the delays are longer and the incidence of
recovery is less frequent in the more serious cases. Those who
wish to destroy tort law and those who want to keep it inviolate
are now deadlocked .
2 . A Plan for Peaceful Coexistence.
Out of this stalemate there is now emerging a consensus that
will accommodate the legitimate interests of those who wish to
compensate everyone and those who want to preserve tort law
peaceful coexistence."' By the addition of a new limited accident
benefits clause to all automobile insurance policies, the tort system
can be repaired without being abolished. In other words, basic
protection would provide for bodily injury or death to all oc-
cupants of an automobile and to any pedestrian struck by that
automobile, regardless of proof of fault. Certain set amounts would
be paid to the estates of persons killed and to persons dismembered
or who lost the sight of one or both eyes . For example, for the
death of a married male between eighteen and fifty-nine years
$5,000.00 would be paid plus $1,000.00 for each additional de-
pendant. In addition to these specific sums, indemnity of up to
334 See Linden, op. cit ., footnote 322, at p . 52 .
335The Report of the Osgoode Hall Study, etc ., op. cit ., footnote 330,
c. IV. At long last this cruel section has been amended to permit an action
if there is "gross negligence", The Highway Traffic Amendment Act, 1966,
S.O ., 1966, c . 64, s . 20, proclaimed in force, Jan. 1st, 1967 .
338 The following is a description of the Ontario Plan, urged in the Final
Report, op. cit ., footnote 328 . See for a detailed description of the plan,
Linden, Peaceful Coexistence and Automobile Accident Compensation
(1966), 9 Can . Bar. J . 5 ; See also Keeton and O'Connell, op . cit., footnote
327 ; Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries (1964),
63 Mich . L. Rev. 279 ; Morris and Paul, The Financial Impact of Auto-
mobile Accidents (1962), 110 U . Pa . L . Rev . 913 .
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$2,000.00 above that provided by other non-tort sources would
be provided for reasonable expenses incurred for necessary medi-
cal, surgical, dental, ambulance and professional nursing expenses .
Funeral expenses of up to $350.60 for each person would be pro-
vided, where necessary, on top of the $2,000.00. Weekly benefits of
$35.00 would be paid to an employed person when totally dis-
abled to a limit of 104 weeks, subject to an extension for an addi-
tional 104 weeks in the- case of total and permanent disability,
but there would be no payment made for the first seven days. Only
where a motorist is driving while unlicensed, while intoxicated or
while in violation of the Criminal Code would he be precluded
from recovery, but - if such driver is killed, his family would not
be deprived of compensation. One of the most outstanding features
of the plan is that there would be no interference with the injured
person's right to sue anyone at fault for his injury, except that any
benefits received underthe proposed new plan would be offset
against any tort recovery .
The cost of this new "accident insurance" has been estimated
by a technical committee of civil servants in Ontario to be an addi-
tional twenty per cent of the basic premium for $35,000.00 mini
mum limits, which would represent an average premium increase
of about $10.00 pet motor vehicle."'
This plan resembles the one operated by the government in
Saskatchewan since 1946."' There is no reason, however, other
than doctrinaire socialism, that would prevent private insurers
from underwriting such a loss insurance scheme. Its attributes are
many: immediate compensation for all; the retention of tort law,
jury trial and general damages; no socialism and no new board;
the schedule of payments would serve only as a minimum. The
defects are few and remediable : the maximum amount of coverage
should be eliminated or at least raised ; one might also question
the adequacy of the amount of the weekly benefit which is lower
than minimum wage laws require if calculated on - the basis of a
forty hour week; moreover, the duration of these payments should
not be limited to four years, since the need for assistance is greatest
in the long term cases; nor should the payments be limited only to
cases of total disability, but they should be available on a scaled
down basis for partial disability . Naturally, these improvements
"'Report of the Automobile Insurance Technical Committee, Ontario
Department of Transport (1965) .
""Now The Automobile Accident Insurance Act, R.S .S ., 1965, c. 409 ;
see Lang, The Nature and Potential of the Saskatchewan Insurance Ex-
periment (1962), 14 U. Fla . L. Rev. 352 .
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would entail additional expense which may be unwarranted at
present, but some money might be saved by introducing a de-
ductible feature of $100.00. When asked whether they would ap-
prove of the establishment of such a plan, seventy-eight per cent
of the people interviewed in the Osgoode Hall Study indicated that
they would."'
In Ontario, legislation was enacted which would enable insurers
to sell this type of coverage on a voluntary basis,"' but it has not
yet been proclaimed in force . The Royal Commission on Auto
mobile Insurance is considering such a plan for British Columbia.
It deserves the attention of the other provinces too for we may
be on the threshold of a major breakthrough in auto accident
compensation .
IV . Whither Canadian Tort Law?
But perhaps we are rejoicing too soon . While Canadian tort law
inexorably spreads its protection ever wider in the areas of oc-
cupiers liability, products liability and automobile accident com-
pensation, some torts scholars are having second thoughts about
the relevance of tort law in modern society. In their drive to secure
compensation for the victims of the accidents generated inevitably
by our mechanized world, torts scholars devised the loss-dis-
tribution theory . It was contended that, because "enterprisers"
could better distribute the losses caused by their activities through
increased prices or through insurance, they should be held liable
m tort."' Although not patently, perhaps, this rationale has spur-
red much growth in tort law. In retrospect, however, it must be
admitted that, because of their dissatisfaction with the state of public
social welfare measures, tort scholars were prepared to transform
tort law into a private social welfare device . If, however, modern
tort law is founded solely upon this theory, the need for it wanes as
governments move into more areas of social welfare. Thus, if the
rush towards the welfare state continues unabated, much of the
law of torts may one day be "doomed to irrelevance"." Neverthe-
less, Professor James has contended that "negligence is far from
dead", at least for the near future, and that these new welfare
regimes "pose no serious threat to our present structure of tort
""See Report of the Osgoode Hall Study, etc., op . cit., footnote 330, c.
VIII.
aao See the Insurance Amendment Act, supra, footnote 327.
aai Ehrenzweig, op . cit ., footnote 13 ; Fleming, op . cit ., footnote 6; Har-
per and James, op . cit ., footnote 13 .
"Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law (1967), 53
Va. L. Rev. 815, at p. 815.
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liability"!" This is so because welfare programmes are not estab-
lished to cover psychic loss nor even to provide complete economic
reimbursement. Consequently, tort law will be able to "supply
additional aid""' for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life,
mental anguish and the like . Tort law, unlike social welfare pro-
grammes, is tailored to treat each claimant as an individual, to
compensate him for his unique losses, and, if he wishes, to give
him his day in court. Some may scoff at the utility of this, but the
ability to play golf, to smell the aroma of a good steak and to hear
the sound of a symphony, although they may not have any econ-
omic value, are prized by the person who has been deprived of
them."' Despite this, if the role of tort law was merely to com-
pensate and nothing else, one might well decide to do without
psychic reparation in return for universal, prompt and inexpen-
sively administered economic compensation .
But tort law is concerned with more than mere compensation .
Fault liability is supposed to deter negligent conduct by making
those guilty of it pay damages to their victims. The increase of in
surance coverage, however, is said to have diluted the prophylactic
power of tort law, but, so far, there is no empirical proof of this . It
may be that certain individuals are no longer deterred by the threat
of civil sanctions while others continue to be . For example, there
are, lamentably, still some drivers and enterprisers who are not in-
sured and, presumably, insurance has not blunted their incentive to
exercise care. In addition, some extra burden may be imposed on a
negligent driver by civil liability, for example, since the loss he
causes may exceed the policy limits, it may not be covered by the
policy at all, the policy may be cancelled altogether or the prem-
ium may be increased. Professor Fleming has even suggested that
an increased premium might be a more effective sanction than a
tort judgment because the latter often cannot be' paid at all while
the former must be if the person wishes to continue driving."' In
addition; the experience of being involved in civil litigation and of
being marked publicly as the cause of injuring someone... is seldom
a pleasant one. An even more important deterrent may be the loss
343 James, The Future of Negligence in Accideflt Law (1967), 53 Va .
L. Rev. 911, at pp. 916-917.144 Fleming, More Thoughts on Loss Distribution (1966), 4 Osgoode
Hall L.J . 161, at p. 172.
345 The Report of the Osgoode Hall Study, etc., op. cit., footnote 330
disclosed that nearly seventy per cent of the victims interviewed favoured
compensation for pain and suffering in all cases, see c. VIII, p. 13 ... . Fleming, op. cit., footnote 342, at p. 825.... Morris, Negligence in Tort Law-With Emphasis on Automobile
Accidents and Unsound Products (1967), 53 Va . L. Rev. 899, at p. 905.
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of his own tort recovery, either in whole or in part, by the negligent
claimant. Moreover, by branding certain conduct as blameworthy,
we may contribute something to the education of our people about
the hazards of these activities ."' Nevertheless, all this discussion
will remain pure theory until someone tests empirically the validity
of these assumptions .
The law of torts is dedicated to the advancement of the notion
of individual responsibility, an ideal that retains considerable force
in western society . Thus, if someone by his faulty conduct causes
an accident, it is felt that he should bear the consequences by pay-
ing the costs incurred by his victim . If it is he himself who is in-
jured, he should be expected to shoulder his own expenses .
According to Professor Keeton,"s most people feel it "just and fair"
that the guilty, but not the innocent, pay, despite the fact that in-
surance undoubtedly dulls the impact of civil liability and social
welfare mollifies that of bearing one's own loss .
Tort law helps to keep the peace, just as it was supposed to
do in its formative days because it permits an aggrieved person
to recover money in court rather than to spill blood in the
streets . This "appeasement" function of tort law may,'"' although
it is speculative, still avoid some further injuries to members of
society . Put another way, there are still people in this world who
wish to secure revenge from those who injure them and who, if
necessary, may resort to anti-social means to do so . By allowing
a private tort remedy this urge for vengeance may be assuaged.''
That tort law rests in part upon such a psychoanalytical basis may
be supported by the experience of the Soviet Union."' After the
revolution, the tort suit was abolished altogether there, but eventu-
ally it had to be re-instituted along with aban on liability insurance .
Another clue to indicate that tort law's roots may reach into the
psyche may be our remarkable insistence upon the hypocritical
retention of the tort suit against the individual defendant in form,
despite the fact that in substance an insurance company is almost
always the real defendant who retains counsel, defends the action
and pays the judgment, if one is rendered against the individual
defendant .
sse Keeton, Is there a Place for Negligence in Modern Tort Law (1967),
53 Va. L. Rev . 886, at p. 889 .
'49 Ibid ., at p . 891 . See also Weiler, Defamation, Enterprise Liability,
and Freedom of Speech (1967), 17 U.T.L .J . 278, at p . 292 .
sso
Ibid .
ssiEhrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence (1953), 47 N.W.U.L .
Rev . 855.
sas Gray, Soviet Tort Law: The New Principles Annotated, 119641 U .
Ill. L.F. 180 ; See also Fleming, op . cit., footnote 342, at p . 824 .
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Put, in the long run, the most compelling argument asserted
for the continuance of tort law may be that of "general deterrence",
developed by Professor Calabresi of Yale University ."' By de
manding that an activity pay its own way, society is able to make
a more knowledgeable decision concerning the allocation of its
resources. In-other words, if motorists were made to pay the full
costs of motoring, including the expenses of treating all traffic
victims, some of them might give up driving anduse a safer method
of transportation where the cost of insurance will be less because
it produces fewer accidents. Other motorists might decide to reduce
their insurance rates through an alteration of their risk category;
they might, therefore, stop driving to work or they might deny
the car to their teenage sons . However, we may find that, rather
than giving up their automobiles, some motorists will chose to drive
without insurance coverage, which is by no means desirable. This
general deterrence theory, consequently, purports to create an "in-
centive for loss prevention""' that encourages enterprisers to
minimize accidents so as to reduce their long term insurance costs,
but unfortunately, this theory has not yet been buttressed by solid
scientific data. Until the analysis of Professor Calabresi is tested
by empirical research it will remain only a theory, albeit a beguiling
one. Professor Keeton has attempted to justify morally the imposi-
tion of this liability because to do otherwise would be to counten-
ance the "unjust enrichment" of motorists or enterprisers ."'
Tort law, therefore, is resting on shifting sands. As tort doctrine
moves towards more protection for injury victims, it is undergoing
a serious reappraisal . The need for a law of torts is being chal
lenged because of wider social welfare legislation and broader
insurance coverage. Nevertheless, on closer scrutiny, one must con-
clude that tort law will survive for some time to come because it
fills the lacunae left in the social welfare programmes, because
civil liability may still deter some people, because it promotes
individual responsibility, because it assists in keeping the peace,
because it may satisfy certain irrational psychological drives, and,
"'The Decision for Accidents : An Approach to Non-Fault Allocation
of Costs (1965), 78 Harv . L. Rev. 713 ; Plum 'and Kalven, Public Law
Perspectives on a Private Law Problem-Auto Compensation Plans (1965),
also (1964), 31 U . Chi . L . Rev. 64 1 ; Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the
Wonderful World of Plum and Kalven (1965), 75 Yale L .1< . 216 ; Plum
and Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi-Auto Accidents and
General Deterrence (1967), 34 U . Chi . L. Rev . 239 .
354 Keeton, op . cit., footnote 348, at p . 888 .
ass Keeton, op . cit., ibid., at p . 892 . Professor Weiler suggests that the
cost of accident might have to be included in the price of automobiles
rather than insurance premiums, loc. cit., footnote 349, at p . 303 .
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most importantly, because some general deterrence may be
achieved.
In the years immediately ahead, Canadians must reconsider the
foundations upon which the law of torts rests. Hopefully, our
judiciary will do this not by accepting English authority without
question as they have in . the past, but by balancing the various
competing policy considerations in the light of Canadian social and
economic conditions . One good prophecy, however, is that Can-
adian tort law, in some form or another, will still be in existence in
the year 2067 . Another safe forecast is that the torts scholars a
century from now will regard our present law of torts with as much
disgust as we view that of 1867 .
